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PRIVACY IN THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY COURTS*
MARY Jo OBEE**
& WILLIAM C. PLOUFFE, JR.***
INTRODUCTION
Since January, 1995, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma has been offering remote access to full elec-
tronic case files, dockets, claims registers and all documents.
Technical discussions on design and implementation of the sys-
tem were rigorous and involved many groups with interest in the
bankruptcy system. Part of the discussion with each group con-
cerned the extent and manner of access to the documents. Top-
ics included the extent of information to be included in
searchable debtor and creditor indexes and whether the infor-
mation should be available on the Internet or through a more
limited access dial-in system. The major issue of discussion con-
cerned whether access to case files and pleadings should mirror
today's accessibility to paper records as closely as possible or
whether access levels should be changed to maximize use of the
capabilities of today's technology. Because of the level of con-
cern raised, we chose to provide only limited, dial-in access.
The level of controversy over this topic has increased greatly
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since that time as other courts have begun providing access to
electronic case records over the Internet. The specific issues
being discussed in the bankruptcy community regarding access
are not unique and have been ongoing for several decades in the
private and public sectors and in other countries. Access to med-
ical, tax, marketing, credit, banking, Social Security and driver's
license records have all been the subject of discussion. Contro-
versy over the breadth of information now collected by entities,
including the courts, is only a portion of the debate. The major-
ity of the concern with collection of personal information of the
types listed above arises not from provision of the information in
any one place, such as records collection in bankruptcy court, or
for any one purpose, but from the proliferation of databases,
called data warehouses, ease of access to those databases and the
ability to combine information from several places using data
mining to make a detailed profile of an individual.1
Currently, access to bankruptcy records is limited absent
electronic records. Reviewing information on a debtor requires
a visit to the courthouse or obtaining copies of pleadings
through a lengthy process of exchanging correspondence with
the clerk's office. One can access information through a name
search on a specific debtor or by having knowledge of a specific
case number. Requesting information about random, unknown
parties or requesting wholesale review of all cases is time and cost
prohibitive. Therefore, people do not seek information ran-
domly or on a wholesale basis, but only come into contact with
the records of those known, specific individuals they are inter-
ested in. Easily searchable information on creditors or attorneys
does not exist at all. These circumstances have provided a "prac-
tical obscurity" to the sensitive, personally identifiable informa-
tion present in all bankruptcy cases.2
The competing access interests of those involved in bank-
ruptcy cases have lain dormant until the prospect of altering the
level of access to the information from this current practice
became possible. The first concern regarding access brought to
our attention involved the privacy interests of all parties identi-
1. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAKING GOV-
ERNMENT WORK: ELECTRONIC DELIVERY OF FEDERAL SERVICES 144 (1993); FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE
SERVICES (1997); Presidential Directive on Privacy of Personal Information, Pri-
vacy and Personal Information in Federal Records, May 14, 1998, available in
1998 WL 241263; Glenn R. Simpson, E-Commerce Firms Start to Rethink Opposition
to Privacy Regulation as Abuses, Anger Rises, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2000, at A24.
2. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
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fled in cases, including debtors, creditors and their respective
attorneys. All of these groups wished that we provide as little
public access to information specifically about them as necessary
for the proper administration of a case and no more. While
espousing an interest in protecting information pertaining to
themselves, creditors and attorneys also expressed an interest in
being provided unlimited access to information involving other
creditors, attorneys and debtors. Finally, a third interest group,
consisting of third parties not involved directly in any particular
case, desired unlimited, wholesale access to information to evalu-
ate the operation of the judiciary and effectiveness of the bank-
ruptcy law, for collecting financial information for subsequent
sale or to use for purposes other than the administration of a
bankruptcy case. This group included news media, academia
and commercial entities such as brokers, credit reporting compa-
nies, real estate title and abstract companies and lenders.
Answering the many questions concerning whether access to
bankruptcy records should be altered from current practice, and
if so how, requires looking at these issues within the context of
the increase in information collected and disseminated across
our global society. We are cognizant that any analysis must be
aware of the larger issues of access in coming to terms with pub-
lic access to court data. In most other contexts, the public, com-
mentators and legislators have been asking that the reasons for
collecting information and for providing access to it be reviewed
first because "[t] he mere fact that a record has been public his-
torically does not justify continued treatment without first exam-
ining the reasons behind the original policy."3
To begin the analysis, it is useful to identify the information
being discussed and then look at the reasons why people are
arguing over access to it. The discussion should then continue by
identifying the interests of individual privacy and public access
which are being espoused in general. These interests can then
be explored by reviewing the history of access and privacy in
court proceedings and records, and applying the concepts in the
general debates on access to records in the federal courts.
Finally, we will try to find a solution or solutions to the question
of whether, and if so how, to alter access to bankruptcy
information.
3. Bruce D. Goldstein, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal Informa-
tion: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY LJ. 1185,
1213 (1992).
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I. THE NATURE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION, COLLECTION
AND DISSEMINATION
It is difficult to read any legal publication, or magazine and
newspaper of general interest, and not find an article concerning
the use of new technology to collect and disseminate personal
information.4 The discourse is almost a frenzy. Most of the gen-
eral interest literature details some horror story of lives hurt or
ruined due to use of information about a person which was freely
available to others without the person's knowledge.5
Commentators define personal information as any informa-
tion which is linked or related to an individual through a com-
monly used, yet unique identifier.6 Records kept on individuals
and entities which are linked by such an identifier are numerous
and contain an amazing array of information concerning finan-
cial activity, criminal records, health records, employment infor-
mation, geographic information, physical characteristics as well
as one's beliefs and behavior.7 These records have been col-
lected for many decades and often outlive their subjects.
4. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in
Electronic Commerce: Why Self Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847 (1998);
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193
(1998); T. Christopher McLaughlin et al., Financial Institutions Fraud, 35 AM.
CluM. L. REV. 789 (1998); Martha Brannigan, Quintiles Seeks Mother Lode in Health
"Data Mining, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1999, at B4; Andrea Petersen & Matthew
Rose, Database of a Merged A OL Brings Cheers and Chills, WAIL ST. J.,Jan. 14, 2000,
at B6; Glenn R. Simpson, Intuit Acts to Curb Leaks on Web Site, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2,
2000, at A3.
5. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in
the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1159 (1997) (fraudulent use of
Social Security Number caused five years of credit problems, theft of wallet
resulting in identity theft and false arrest for murder and robbery, typographic
error in data entry for credit bureau caused almost entire town to experience
credit problems); Jon G. Auerbach et al., Prying Eyes: With These Operators, Your
Bank Account is Now an Open Book, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1998; Peter Lewis, License
Database Compromised: Online Paper Posted Wrong Access Codes on Web Site, SEATtE
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1998, at Bi; Peter Maas, How Confidential are Your Personal Affairs,
PARADE MAGAZINE, Apr. 19, 1998; Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy, TIME,
Aug. 25, 1997; Thomas E. Ricks, This Stealth Offense Turns Military Brass into Sit-
ting Ducks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1999, at Al (detailing fraud obtaining credit
cards in names of military officers whose names and social security numbers
were placed on the Internet after being obtained through the Congressional
Record); Credit Card Numbers are Stolen by Hacker, Then Posted on Web, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 11, 2000, at B10.
6. See George Trubow, The Development and Status of "Information Privacy"
Law and Policy in the United States, in INVITED PAPERS ON PRIVACY- LAw, ETHICS
AND TECHNOLOGY (1981).
7. Regarding public sector record keeping, see Heyward C. Hosch, The
Interest in Limiting the Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis,
36 VAND. L. REv. 139, 140 n.5 (1983). For private sector record keeping, see
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While such a broadly defined list of records sounds innocu-
ous and collection of this information has been relatively unchal-
lenged in the past, the quantity and detail of information which
can now be compiled on an individual from just a handful of
record keepers is astounding. Information collected can easily
give a profile of an individual including the following: name, per-
sonal photograph, age, sex, address, social security number, tele-
phone number, names and information on family members, size
and types of rooms in your home, satellite images of your neigh-
borhood and street maps to your home, employment informa-
tion, income, names of creditors, outstanding debts, arrests and
convictions, tax liens, lawsuits referencing your name, books and
publications read, hotels and casinos visited, medical products
purchased, foods purchased at grocery stores, whether you hunt
or fish and whether you are an officer of a business.'
The entities collecting this information are almost too
numerous to list. It is safe to assume that anyone you come into
contact with, except other individuals, is keeping records. Every
type of government entity, whether local, municipal, state or fed-
eral, keeps computerized records. These entities maintain hun-
dreds, probably thousands, of computerized databases on
individuals. Recorders of deeds and liens, taxing authorities,
schools and colleges, keepers of drivers license and voting
records, various welfare and benefit providing agencies, law
enforcement agencies, the postal service, libraries and the courts
all keep records on individuals. Private entities keeping comput-
erized records include: credit bureaus, banks, mortgage compa-
nies, stock brokers, news media, insurance companies, the
Medical Information Bureau, hospitals, doctors and pharmacies,
employers, churches, clubs, manufacturers, grocery stores,
departments stores and list and information brokers.
We provide some information voluntarily when we fill out a
form for a government entity, a warranty survey card, an applica-
Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfeld, Privacy Please: Will the Internet Industry Act to Pro-
tect Consumer Privacy Before the Government Steps In?, 54 Bus. LAw. 349 (1999). See
also David J. Klein, Keeping Business Out of the Bedroom: Protecting Personal Privacy
Interests from the Retail World, 15J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 391 (1997).
8. See DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA, Is YOUR PRIVATE LIFE IN THE
PUBLIC EYE? (1989); Sandra Byrd Petersen, Your Life as an Open Book: Has Tech-
nology Rendered Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 163 (1995);
David Bank, Know Your Customer, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1999, at R18 (detailing
techniques and uses of profiling); Blumenfeld, supra note 7, at 353; Gindin,
supra note 5. Robert Gellman, Who is Using IT the Most to Invade Our Privacy ?,
GOVT COMPUTER NEWS, Sept. 13, 1999; Secret Service Financed License Photo
Database, DAILY OKi-AHoMAN, Feb. 19, 1999; Charles J. Sykes, Your Best Defense
Against Big Brother: You, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2000, at A27.
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tion for credit or when we answer a survey. In most instances,
however, information is obtained without our knowledge or con-
sent. A great deal of information is collected whenever a
purchase is made using a grocery store shopping card, credit
card, debit card or a check. Even borrowing a book from the
library results in a record.9 Insurance companies receive infor-
mation through interviews with neighbors and co-workers and in
some instances through surveillance. Collection of information
upon access to the Internet, through identification tags on com-
puting chips and through "cookies," is a new source of acquiring
information. Finally, information is acquired by third parties
from the original collectors. Many government agencies receive
information from private entities complying with statutory
reporting requirements.' ° In the private sector, most informa-
tion is acquired by third parties through sales from the original
collectors, including stores, financial institutions, credit card
companies and government agencies.11
Government uses of personally identifiable information fall
in four main areas: law enforcement, tax collection, benefit pro-
gram payment and tracking and various regulatory applications
and enforcement. Various federal, state and local law enforce-
ment entities are performing increasing data warehousing and
data mining of multiple data bases to perform criminal activity
monitoring and criminal profiling and tracking. 12
The list of uses of such information in the private sector is
long:
-Solicitation of contributions for charitable or political
organizations;
-Location of persons and assets for debt collections;
-Product and service market research and sales;
-Medical research;
-Sociological and economic research;
-Determination of employment eligibility;
-Determination of housing eligibility;
-Dispensing medical, legal and other professional advise.
The largest uses in the private sector involve credit and sales.
Entities use the information they collect or purchase to deter-
mine buying preferences for direct mail marketing and to evalu-
9. See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living
With Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 486
(1996).
10. See id.
11. Seeid.
12. See id. at 489.
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ate an extension of credit. The second largest use of information
again relates to commerce, generally debt collection, by list and
information brokers to private investigators, lawyers and insur-
ance companies.
While most of these uses are arguably to the benefit of soci-
ety and individuals, harmful and illegal uses of this information
are becoming more common. Identity theft and stalking are two
areas where the ease of access to detailed personal information
has hurt a growing number of people. Identity theft allows the
perpetrator to steal from creditors often harming the lives of
their innocent victims in addition to the theft from the credi-
tor.13 Some identity thieves commit more violent crimes includ-
ing burglary and murder virtually anonymously under the
identity of another.14 Further, stalkers have murdered victims
using detailed information on their residences and habits found
by compiling information from easily accessed information
sources such as drivers license databases.
Prior to changes in technology and society contemporane-
ous with the Civil War, individuals were anonymous except to
those they knew personally. Few records were kept and one func-
tioned in a society where decisions and activities were based on
personal observations.1" In the late 1800s and early 1900s, popu-
lation grew and people moved to cities. Transactions and activi-
ties were based less on personal observations and relationships
and more on recorded information which was available only to
the recorder.16 In spite of the amount of information collected,
this "practical obscurity" gave the appearance of privacy pro-
tected.17 Over the last thirty years, technology, and the ever
more intense collection of personal information, has caused
one's life to become an open book. Until the last fifteen years,
gathering all of the information cited earlier in one compilation
was prohibitive in cost and time unless the person concerned was
a public figure. Some of the information discussed, such as
purchases at a grocery store, was not available in any record.
13. See supra note 5. See also Sandra T. M. Chong, Data Privacy: The Use of
Prisoners for Processing Personal Information, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 201 (1998);
Kristen S. Provenza, Identity Theft: Prevention and Liability, 3 N.C. BANKING INST.
319 (1999); Maria Ramirez-Palafox, Identity Theft on the Rise: Will the RealJohn Doe
Please Step Fonard?, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 483 (1998); Margaret Mannix, Getting
Serious About Identity Theft, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 8, 1999, at 88.
14. See supra note 13.
15. See PERSONAL PRIVACY STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION AGE 1-2 (1977).
16. See id. at 2.
17. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
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While one may object to the acquisition and use of informa-
tion, it is clear that some information must be collected and used
for the activities of our society to function.18 The problem, in
essence, involves the interplay between the functioning of a per-
son within society and everyone's need to withdraw from society
at times and in different ways. 19 The objections by commenta-
tors, legislators and the public on electronic access to informa-
tion are twofold. First, they are concerned about the
proliferation of unknown and unauthorized use of the informa-
tion in ways unrelated to the purpose for which it was first col-
lected.2" They are asking also that the original collectors of the
information provide support for what is collected, in particular,
they object to the collection of too much information, that which
is inappropriate and irrelevant for the activity or transaction it is
collected for."l
The proliferation of these invasions on electronic informa-
tion are keyed to a relationship which identifies all information
as belonging to a specific individual. In the United States, the
unique, universal identifier is the social security number.
Indeed, in the report of the Senate committee marking up the
Privacy Act of 1974, the use of social security numbers was cited
as "one of the most serious manifestations of privacy concerns in
the nation." In the twenty-five years following that report, the
problems of linking personal information together using social
security numbers has only worsened.
It is this link, along with technology, which has brought the
issue to the fore.22 While in the past, the information on what
groceries one bought, the progression of residences one lived in
and one's financial history did not seem sensitive it does appear
18. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A
STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 37 (1996); W. Ware, A Taxonomy for
Privacy, in INVITED PAPERS ON PRIVACY. LAW, ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY 27
(1981)).
19. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 18, at 37-39.
20. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N., STAFF REPORT ON THE PUBLIC WORKSHOP
ON CONSUMER PRIVACY IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1996);
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, REPORT TO CONGRESS CONCERNING
THE AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL FRAUD
(1997); MARYJ. CULNAN, PRIVACY AND THE Top 100 WEB SITES: A REPORT TO THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1999); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying and
Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV.
173 (1998).
21. See supra note 20.
22. See Thomas B. Kearns, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Conver-
gence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
975 (1999); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Invisible Becomes Manifest: Information Privacy in a
Digital Age, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 151 (1998).
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from the great amount of commentary that the public always
considered this information sensitive. The news articles and vari-
ous surveys and studies have the theme that individuals thought
this sensitive information was protected, they want it to continue
to be protected and something should be done to protect it
again.
The public is being heard through the media on the issue of
what comprises sensitive information. Reviewing these articles
indicates that any financial or medical information is considered
sensitive. Federal and state areas of legislation also provide
insight as to what information has been considered sensitive.23
Two long standing pieces of legislation, the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and the Internal Revenue Code, provide protections for
sensitive information collected by public agencies linked to spe-
cific individuals.24
The public has only recently begun to voice a concerted dis-
approval of use and access to information linked to social secur-
ity numbers.25 Social security numbers are collected and
referenced almost daily for every person in this country and
related to some activity or commercial transaction. 26 This rela-
tion of a product or service purchased, bank transaction, medical
visit or government record to a social security number later
allows the detailed profiles referenced earlier to be compiled.
Even the charitable act of donating blood generates a record
23. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, COMPEN-
DIUM OF STATE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION: 1997 OVERVIEW (1997); CRIM-
INAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION: COMPENDIUM OF STATE PRIVACY AND
SECURITY LEGISLATION (1992); George Trubow, The Development and Status of
"Information Privacy" Law and Policy in the United States, in INvrrED PAPERS ON
PRIVACY- LAW, ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY (1981). See also Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.); Financial Information Privacy Act of
1999, S. 187, 106th Cong. (1999).
24. See Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation
and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16J.
MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 151-53 n.146 (1998). In response to the
recent publication of concerns about confidentiality, the Driver's Privacy Pro-
tection Act was enacted. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
The Act is very controversial, but seeks to protect personal information with
links to any specific individual. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir.
1998). Specifically, photographs, social security numbers, license plate num-
bers, name, address, phone number, and medical and disability information is
protected from disclosure. Any information on driving records or information
related to the operation of the state agency is not protected.
25. See Komuves, supra note 24.
26. See id. at 536-49.
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relating a person's name and any diseases to a social security
number. 27
This is the context in which the debate over collection and
disclosure of information in bankruptcy records is set. The infor-
mation collected at the bankruptcy court includes almost every
type of information being discussed in the media, in legislation
discussed earlier and information which has been deemed sensi-
tive in other contexts for many years by federal and state
legislation.
Bankruptcy records add to the detail of the information col-
lected from the other sources mentioned previously, and provide
an increased ability to corroborate information held in these
other databases for profiling purposes. The bankruptcy petition
requires a debtor to list in detail all assets and the whereabouts of
each asset. This list includes the name, address and account
numbers for all types of bank, credit union and brokerage house
assets. It also requires a detailed list of all debts owed, to whom
owed, the amount and the consideration for the debt. Further
information is required on current and past lifestyle circum-
stances, including residences and employment for the three
years previous to filing bankruptcy. A cash flow statement is
required detailing all current sources of income as well as a com-
prehensive listing of expenses, thus providing a very revealing
picture of a person's lifestyle both prior to and upon filing. All
of this information is related to an individual or entity through
their social security or tax identification number, which is
required to be provided on the petition. In some jurisdictions,
the social security or tax identification number of the debtor is
required by local rule to be present on any document filed with
the court.2" Clearly, the bankruptcy process is a very intrusive
gatherer and disseminator of personal information and is part of
the debates on public access to such information.
II. NATURE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS IN INFORMATION
ABOUT INDIVIDUALS
The individual interest in privacy is called upon to protect
various types of activities a person engages in as well as for vari-
ous types of property owned by an individual. Generally, there
are three aspects to privacy: 1) privacy from physical intrusion by
others, 2) privacy with regard to one's own actions, and 3) infor-
27. See id. at 538.
28. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 9004-2; D. Colo. L.B.R. 105; S.D. Iowa Bankr. R. 5;
D. Kan. L.B.R. 1005.2; D.S. D. L.B.R. 9004-2.
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mational privacy.29 The first aspect, privacy from physical intru-
sion by others, is, at least theoretically, protected by the Fourth
Amendment for intrusions by the government3° and by statutory
provisions, to include prohibitions against trespass, and by tort
law for intrusions by private parties.
The second aspect is protected by, inter alia, a number of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions which had their genesis with the
decision of Griswold v. Connecticut.3' These include: the right to
choose a marriage partner,32 the right to use contraceptives,
the right to watch obscene movies,34 the right to have an abor-
tion,35 the right to choose who lives in a house, "6 and the right to
engage in sexual relations (but not homosexual relations).7
This right has also been held to include the right to educate
one's children.38 However, this right was established well before
Griswold.
The third aspect, informational privacy, is more problematic
and the focus of this article. It is generally defined as a limitation
upon the ability of another to gain, disseminate, or use informa-
tion about oneself.39 In the context we are examining, it can be
stated broadly as a notion or idea of privacy in personal informa-
tion and identity.
The extent and history of the contemporary concept of pri-
vacy or confidentiality in various types of information about indi-
viduals extends back over 100 years. Definitions of the interests
expounded are amorphous. The first express reference to a
right to personal or domestic privacy came from Judge Cooley
and was quoted by Justice Brandeis in his seminal article 6n the
29. SeeJUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUrr OF PRIVACY. LAw, ETHICS AND
THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 60 (1997); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
HA v. L. REV. 737, 740 (1989).
30. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a violation
of the Fourth Amendment does not involve a question of a physical trespass,
but involves a reasonable expectation of privacy).
31. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 78 (1977).
34. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
35. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
37. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyerv. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
39. See ABA, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON PERSONAL PRIVACY
AND INFORMATION, SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 5
(1981); Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 740.
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subject.4" Since that time, the debate over this subject has
grown, rising in the last thirty years to its current level concomi-
tantly with changes in technology. 41
Although 100 years old, Justice Brandeis's writings as regards
the concept of privacy are still cogent:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to
the next step which must be taken for the protection of the
person, and for securing to the individual whatJudge Coo-
ley calls the right "to be let alone." . . . The principle which
protects personal writings and any other productions of
the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy, and
the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends
this protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts,
and to personal relations, domestic or otherwise.4 2
Since Justice Brandeis's time, however, technology has only
increased its assault on privacy.
Numerous arguments have been advanced as justifications
for the right of privacy. Three of the basic philosophical argu-
ments for a right of privacy are: 1) it is necessary for intimacy and
social relationships, 2) it is necessary for personhood, and 3) it is
necessary for liberty.
The intimacy and social relationship position, generally,
takes a psychological, as opposed to political, approach to the
right of privacy. This position holds that without privacy, there
can be no intimate or social relationships.43 Although philo-
sophically and psychologically appealing, this argument provides
little in the way of support for a legal argument of the existence
of a right of informational privacy.
The argument that privacy is necessary for the existence of
human beings as "persons" appears to provide little more in sup-
port. This argument states that privacy is an essential element
40. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1878);
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890).
41. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977); SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PER-
SONAL DATA SYS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC & WELFARE, RECORDS, COM-
PUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973); Federal Data Banks, Computers and
the Bill of Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1971); The Computer and Invasion of Privacy:
Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 89th Cong. (1966).
42. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, at 195, 213.
43. See Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF PRIVACY 265 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984); James Rachels,
Why Privacy is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra, at 290.
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for a human being to develop a sense of self and become and
remain a person, in the developmental sense of the word.4 4 Of
course, the definition of "person" is difficult to grasp but is most
rationally interpreted in accordance with the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant, that a person is an end unto himself.45
Closely related to this argument is the claim that privacy is
an essential element of human dignity. It is privacy which per-
mits human beings to be an individual.46 As such, human dignity
provides the link between becoming and remaining an individual
person (i.e., personhood) and the political and legal concept of
liberty, which is the final argument presented in support of the
existence of a right of informational privacy.
This last position, that privacy is necessary for liberty, pro-
vides the greatest degree of support for a legal argument of the
existence of a right of informational privacy. The essence of this
position is that privacy promotes liberty. Indeed, individual pri-
vacy is required for freedom, else tyranny would result.47 Privacy
encourages learning and free inquiry which is the essence of
Immanuel Kant's personal autonomy so essential to the value of
a human being as a person, in the highest sense of the word.
The lack of privacy invites critical examination which lessens
respect for others. Privacy, in essence, promotes liberty.48 And it
is liberty and individuality which are the fundamental political
and legal values of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
Thus, any analysis of a right of informational privacy must be
considered to have significant philosophical value as a liberty
interest, which is the fundamental premise of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. However, at least one author is of the
opinion that fundamental rights carry a much greater value than
just a liberty claim in any legal analysis, as demonstrated by the
application of the "strict scrutiny" test.49
44. SeeJeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 43, at 300.
45. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS (Thomas K. Abbott trans., 1954) (1785).
46. See EdwardJ. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 43, at 156. See also ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-39 (1967).
47. See LINOWES, supra note 8, at 179 (noting that in any totalitarian state,
the first right to disappear is the right of privacy).
48. See Stanley Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 43, at 223; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 43, at 346.
See also WESTIN, supra note 46, at 23-26, 32-39.
49. See DECEW, supra note 29, at 80.
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Commentators, defining the universal concerns of the indi-
vidual in privacy, have identified four privacy interests specific to
individuals supplying information on their personal affairs, all
related to the benefit to the individual derived from releasing the
information. These are, relevancy of information collected, accu-
racy of information as entered originally and subsequently main-
tained by the record-keeper, necessity of the original, restricted
uses for the information, and limitations on subsequent disclo-
sure to third parties.
5°
The interests of the public relative to the activities, property
and information about individuals is reflected in the interests of
a democratic government. These interests are composed of two
competing elements. First, society as a whole has an interest in
privacy of the individual.5' When our society is no longer gov-
erned by individuals, but by a homogenous mass, democracy
ceases to exist.52 A more philosophical expression of this idea is
eloquently stated by Mahatma Gandhi, "If the individual ceases
to count, what is left of society?"53
Second, the nature of democratic government by the people
requires that there be few limits on access to public records.54
The reasoning behind this requirement is stated well by the foun-
ders of this country. The governed must police the state to stop
fraud, waste and oppression.55
Although this philosophy underlies the formation of this
country, there are few express requirements for government rec-
ord keeping and publication of information in the Constitution.
As regards the courts, the requirements for open records and
proceedings in criminal prosecutions is found under the Consti-
tution, in bankruptcy matters under statute and in civil cases
under the common law. This interest has been discussed for all
types of proceedings as a need for the public to assure proceed-
ings are conducted fairly, and that perjury, misconduct and deci-
sions based on secret bias are discouraged.56
Further, society needs information to function; therefore,
any action which chills the willingness of persons to provide
information hurts society. In addition to chilling effects on col-
50. See Horsch, supra note 7, at 141 n.l1; Trubow, supra note 6.
51. See LINoWEs, supra note 8, at 12-14.
52. See Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 805.
53. LINOWFS, supra note 8, at 14.
54. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of
an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 30-32 (1990).
55. See id.
56. See Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501
(1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980).
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lection, the point can be made that when personal information
becomes easy to misuse and inaccurate, then eventually there will
come a point when no one can rely on the information given and
functions of society will be hampered. For example, if a lender
cannot rely on the information provided to it from an applicant
and outside sources, due to identity theft or inaccuracies in data
maintenance, it will incur too great a risk in lending and will
curtail lending.
A. Protection of Individual Interests.
This portion of the paper discusses privacy and protections
of the individual, the next portion discusses the interests and
protection of those on the other side of the debate. The collec-
tion of statutes, common law and claimed constitutional protec-
tions for various types of activities, property and rights in one's
body, person and information are thin. The extension of spe-
cific legal sources of protection to personal information col-
lected by public sector and private sector records keepers is
tenuous or fiddled with loopholes and exemptions. This hodge-
podge of laws reflects the unsettled nature of the debate as to the
bounds of privacy in personal information.
For this section, "private interests" will be defined to mean
those interests which belong to or can be claimed by a private
individual. Although artificial entities, such as corporations, can
be construed to be "private," their unique status as creatures of
statute with, inter alia, limited protections, indicates they should
not be considered here.
Further, in addition to the federal provisions, there are
numerous protections at the state level. As this article concerns
the federal bankruptcy courts and the state protections are
varied and numerous, these state protections will not be
addressed.
1. Constitutional
The Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, is considered to be the foundation for pri-
vacy protections. Although it was, initially, considered to only
apply to physical intrusions, 7 in Katz, the Supreme Court
expanded its scope to include interests where there is a "reason-
able expectation of privacy.""8 This decision laid the ground-
work for the recognition of the right of informational privacy.
57. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 436 (1928).
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967).
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Since Katz, the Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe,59 explicitly rec-
ognized the threat to privacy by the accumulation of large
amounts of data and, thereby, implicitly recognized the right to
informational privacy. However, the right must be balanced by
competing interests.6 ° In Whalen, the Supreme Court recognized
a legitimate interest of the state in collecting certain data.
It must be mentioned that the Fourth Amendment is not the
only constitutional source of the right to privacy. In Griswold, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the Ninth Amendment and the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights as constitutional authority to
acknowledge the right of privacy.6 1 However, constitutional pro-
tections of privacy only apply against the government and not
against individuals.
Defining the scope of constitutional privacy rights is a diffi-
cult task. There is no doubt that fundamental privacy includes
such issues as contraception, child rearing and education, family
relationships, and who to marry. However, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the outer limits of the constitutional right to
privacy have not been defined.62
2. Common Law
The common law tort of invasion of privacy provides protec-
tion against violations of privacy where the Constitution does
not. Four separate torts are recognized: 1) placing a person in a
false public light, 2) intrusion into a person's solitude, 3) public
disclosure of private facts, and 4) appropriation of a person's
name or likeness.63
These four torts do not adequately address the concerns of
informational privacy. The tort of false light requires that the
information be false and be made public. The tort of intrusion is
usually applied to actual intrusions and must be offensive to the
59. 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding, however, that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not protect the right of privacy).
60. For example, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975),
the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right of free press outweighed
the statutory and common law right to privacy where the name of a rape victim
had already been announced in a public court proceeding. In an even more
interesting case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that even if
documents are prohibited from disclosure by the Freedom of Informaiton Act,
if they are entered into court records, the court is not required to place them
under seal. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir.
1983).
61. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1976).
63. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §652A (1977); William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960).
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reasonable person. The tort of public disclosure required disclo-
sure to the public at large and not just a few people. The tort of
appropriation is usually applied in the context of advertising.6 4
Each of these torts do not address the problem of informational
privacy which includes the additional concerns of obtaining,
maintaining, and privately communicating personal information.
However, one author recognizes that these four torts do, at least,
provide the basis for causes of action for violation of information
privacy. 6
5
3. Statutory
Statutes provide, perhaps, the most powerful tool for the
protection of private interests, depending, of course, on the
scope of wording.
a. Fair Credit Reporting Act 6 6
This Act restricts private entities in the credit reporting
industry to releasing information only to those entities it reason-
ably believes have a legitimate business need for the information
(i.e., such as evaluation of credit worthiness, employment, insur-
ance, etc.). However, the term "legitimate business need" has
been characterized by at least one author as a "broad loop-
hole."67 Thus, although the law purports to protect private inter-
ests, it is, in practice, almost meaningless.
b. Privacy Act of 197468
This Act restricts the federal government's actions with
regard to the information it collects. The government cannot
release a written record without written consent unless certain
circumstances exist. These circumstances include "routine use,"
law enforcement purposes, and protection of the health and
safety of an individual. However, the provisions of this Act do
not restrict private individuals.
This Act was amended by the Computer Matching and Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1988.69 This amendment allows govern-
ment agencies, within certain written guidelines, to compare
computerized records to establish or verify eligibility for benefits
or to recoup payments on benefits. It also allows comparison for
64. See Petersen, supra note 8.
65. See Gindin, supra note 5.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1998).
67. Petersen, supra note 8, at 181.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994).
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personnel and payroll purposes. However, law enforcement, tax
collection, and foreign counter-intelligence purposes are not
covered by the amendment.
c. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 197470
This Act limits access to the educational records of students.
d. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 197871
This Act restricts the government's access to financial infor-
mation held by an institution concerning a private individual
without the person's consent or a valid warrant, subpoena, or
summons. Further, any such release of information must be for
law enforcement purposes and the person must be notified of
the release.
e. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 198672
This Act provides for the protection of financial records at
financial institutions. Entities who have suffered economic dam-
age may initiate a cause of action under this statute. The mere
release of a virus into the Internet will constitute a violation
under this law. 73
f Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 T7
This Act amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. It protects against the unauthorized
access, interception, or disclosure of private electronic communi-
cations by the government or private persons. The government
is required to obtain a warrant before doing so. However, there
are exceptions. One is that the communications service may dis-
close information to a law enforcement agency if the communi-
cation appears to involve a crime. Another is for
communications which are readily accessible to the public (i.e.,
the Internet). And another is for interception and disclosure in
the ordinary course of business, which courts have ruled include
the monitoring of employees.75
70. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1232(g) (1998).
71. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
73. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
74. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
75. See, e.g., Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens, Inc., 802 F.2d 412 (11th
Cir. 1986).
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g. Video Privacy Protection Act of 198876
This Act restricts the release of information concerning the
videos that an individual rents. A similar provision applies to the
release of information concerning the viewing habits of subscrib-
ers to cable television.
77
h. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 199478
This Act limits the release of information held by state
departments of motor vehicles. This statute, however, has two
loopholes: one for private investigators and another when drivers
are given clear and conspicuous notice of possible disclosures on
application and renewal forms.
i. Internal Revenue Code79
The I.R.S. is limited in releasing information gathered and
maintained for tax purposes. Generally, tax returns and associ-
ated information are confidential. There are a number of excep-
tions which include release of information to: 1) state tax
authorities, 2) Congress, 3) the President, 4) law enforcement
agencies, and 5) courts.
j. The Freedom of Information Act
Under the Freedom of Information Act, there are a number
of recognized exceptions to the access of government informa-
tion. Two of these exceptions encompass the release of informa-
tion which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. These two exceptions focus on personnel, medical, and
law enforcement records."0 In these situations, the courts will
balance the interests of revelation with the interests of privacy."1
k. Social Security Numbers
Much discussion has been generated over the need to keep
social security numbers private. The Ninth Circuit has indicated
that there is a right to informational privacy, although this deci-
sion has not resulted in widespread judicial recognition. 2
Although this decision could be used as a basis for not revealing
76. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1994).
77. See Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
78. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1998).
80. See5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) & (7) (1994).
81. See Hoch v. C.I.A., 593 F. Supp. 675 (D. D.C. 1983).
82. See Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1988); but see In re
Crawford, 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1244 (2000).
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the social security number in bankruptcy proceedings, a number
of bankruptcy courts do not follow this reasoning.8 3
Although Section 7 of the Privacy Act restricts the use of the
social security number by the government, there are so many
exceptions to the mandate, that the restriction is essentially use-
less.84 Although the law allows a person to refuse to divulge the
social security number, where such divulgence is not mandatory,
with no loss of benefits; this provision does not apply in the bank-
ruptcy courts as divulgence is considered mandatory.8 5
In light of these proscriptions, one must ask whether it is
appropriate (or legal) for the executive branch to be held to
standards of privacy which are not applicable to the judicial
branch? Although it may very well be statutorily legal for the
bankruptcy courts to disclose certain sensitive personal informa-
tion (i.e., social security numbers86 ), does such disclosure meet
the demands of public policy? Does revealing the social security
number in a "plain vanilla" bankruptcy case further any signifi-
cant or compelling public interests or does doing so actually vio-
late other, more vital, interests-such as informational privacy?
For reasons of consistency, it would seem that the social security
numbers should not be revealed, unless other overriding factors
are present (i.e., the social security number is an element of the
crime to be proven).
L Other Statutes
The issue of individual privacy is clearly paramount in
today's society. This is especially true of informational privacy.
Numerous bills have been presented in Congress in recent years
to protect informational privacy.87
83. See In re Anderson, 159 B.R. 830, 838-39 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1993).
84. See Komuves, supra note 24, at 569.
85. See II U.S.C. § 342(c) (1994). See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1005; In re
Anderson, at 838-39.
86. A number of courts have held that bankruptcy petition preparers do
not have a fundamental right to refuse to disclose their social security numbers
in the face of 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1994), which requires that they do so. See In
re Adams, 214 B.R. 212 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997); In re Rausch, 213 B.R. 364 (D.
Nev. 1997). See also In reAdair, 212 B.R. 171 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding
that the Privacy Act is not grounds for a debtor to refuse to disclose his social
security number in violation of FED. R. BANKR. P. 1005). Indeed, the Rausch
court noted that several other courts have held that there is no fundamental
privacy right to refuse to disclose a social security number. See Rausch, 213 B.R.
at 367 (citing McElrath v. Califano, 615 F.2d 424, 441 (7th Cir. 1980); Doyle v.
Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (D. Del. 1982).
87. See Gindin, supra note 5, at 1217-18.
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B. Protections of Public Interests
As stated previously, two groups claim interest in informa-
tion about individuals. We have just visited the claims of the indi-
vidual to privacy in his or her personal information. We now visit
the claimed "need to know" of the public in that same
information.
It is difficult to define "public interest." As a general matter,
public interest has been defined as something in which the com-
munity at large has an interest or something which affects the
rights or liabilities of the public. It does not include those things
which are the object of mere curiosity or things which only
involve particular localities. Matters of public interest include
the affairs of local, state, and national governments.
8 8
The question remains, then, who defines the public interest
in personal information? In practice, the legislature, ° the exec-
utive, ° and the courts9 1 all have the authority, to differing
degrees depending upon circumstances, to define what is in the
public interest. However, when the courts decide what is in the
public interest, they usually employ a balancing test. Moreover,
any test of what is in the public interest is a flexible standard.9 2
The primary statutory expression of the public interest of
access to government information is the Freedom of Information
Act.93 Its purpose is, generally, that the records of government
agencies are open to public inspection. The philosophical basis
of this statute is that for a democracy to flourish and for the peo-
ple to trust government, there must be open access to the activi-
ties of government. 4
However, there are several statutory exceptions to access to
information in government records. These include: 1) national
security and foreign affairs, 2) internal agency personnel proce-
dures, 3) information specifically excluded by statute, 4) trade
88. See Russell v. Wheeler, 439 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1968); Burgum v. North
Dakota Hosp. Serv. Ass'n, 106 N.W.2d 545, 547 (N.D. 1960); Glenn County
Attorney v. Crockett County Assessor, 220 P. 816, 817 (Okla. 1922).
89. See, e.g., Pan Am. Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 308 (1963).
90. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 311 n.14
(1949).
91. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. AFL-CIO, Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 221
(1965).
92. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
94. See Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held Information in
the Computer Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 543, 545 (1993) (quoting Thomas Jefferson and James Madison).
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secrets and commercial or financial information, 5) inter or
intra-agency memos which would only be available to other agen-
cies involved in litigation against that agency, 6) personnel and
medical files where revealing them would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, 7) law enforcement
records where revelation would interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings, deprive a person of the right to a fair trial, constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, reasonably to
be expected to reveal a confidential source, reveal law enforce-
ment techniques or procedures, or place a person in physical
danger, 8) information related to the regulation or supervision
of financial institutions, and 9) geological and geophysical infor-
mation.95 These exceptions provide statutory protection for the
enumerated public interests.
The Freedom of Information Act, however, does not apply
to the courts because the courts are not considered an "agency"
for the purposes of the Act.96 But this does not mean that the
Freedom of Information Act is useless concerning the issue
examined in this article. Even though it does not apply to the
courts as a matter of law, it can be a guide for establishing policy.
As a matter of public policy, the United States Supreme Court
would likely recognize and indeed has already recognized some
of these exceptions as applying to court records to prevent the
release of sensitive information.97
The Freedom of Information Act expressly recognizes the
significant public policy interest in open government records,
which, in a free society, is essential.9" However, the Act also
expressly recognized, in its exemptions, that personal privacy is
an individual private interest which can trump the public inter-
est.9 In such a situation, it would seem likely that the enumer-
ated public interests would take precedence over individual
privacy interests, although there are notable exceptions such as
rape shield statutes.'
Another protection as a balancing interest in the considera-
tion of public interests is government efficiency. In the context
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994).
96. See5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (1994). See also In re Adair, 212 B.R. 171,173
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997).
97. Consider, for example, the judiciary's well known refusals to release
the identities of confidential informants and the courts' refusal to divulge
national security information.
98. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1975);
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973).
99. See 5 U.S.C. § 522(b) (6) & (7) (1994).
100. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West 1999).
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of the First Amendment, government efficiency has been recog-
nized as a factor to be considered.10 1 Considering that the First
Amendment concerns the dissemination of information, these
authorities could be analogized to the public nature of judicial
records. Additional support for this argument of government
efficiency is found in the bankruptcy statutes which mandate the
disclosure of the social security number.10 2 Thus, it could be
argued that there is a general public interest in everyone having
a national identifying number, thus, providing some support for
the use of social security numbers in public documents such as
bankruptcy petitions as a means to notify potential creditors and
to properly and accurately identify the debtor.103 Thus, the effi-
ciency argument is closely related to the purposes espoused in
the bankruptcy statutes-proper notification of creditors of the
accurate identity of the debtor.
Another interesting protection of the public interest is the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.'04 This statute appears to have
some indirect conflict with the purpose of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act and the judicial policy of open records. Where the
Freedom of Information Act is based on the policy of open
records, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act criminalizes the
mere unauthorized access of a government computer."0 5 Thus,
information that belongs in the public domain and which is
accessed in a government computer without authorization is a
criminal act. In this sense, it appears that greater emphasis is
being placed upon government authority and procedure than
101. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994); Board of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994)
(O'Conner, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Bunker, supra
note 94, at 554 (discussing the balancing of the right to access government
information with the public interest of government efficiency).
102. At least one bankruptcy court has acknowledged that the Freedom
of Information Act is not proper grounds for requesting that the social security
number not be released. See In re Adair, 212 B.R. 171 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997).
Further, despite all the recent public concern expressed over the privacy
issues associated with disclosure of social security numbers, at least one court
has held that there is no fundamental right to privacy in a social security
number. See In re Rausch, 213 B.R. 364, 367 (D. Nev. 1997); Komuves, supra
note 24 (discussing the use of the SSN as a national identifier as gaining more
and more acceptance both by government agencies and private entities).
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 342(c) (1994). See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1005; In re
Anderson, 159 B.R. 830, 838-39 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
105. See United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1996).
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upon the policy of open records. 10 6 Thus, as almost all govern-
ments records are now computerized, it would seem that there
are public interest protections for all records, depending upon
the mode of access and whether access is authorized.
In sum, there are numerous protections for public interests.
The difficult aspect for any tribunal will be deciding whether the
claimed public interest is, in fact, a public interest such that it
should override a private interest.
III. AVAILABILrIY OF INFORMATION FROM THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CURRENT LAW AND REASONING
So far, our discussion has identified a growing problem in
society as a whole with the extent of information collection and
the intrusive use and misuse of that information. Concomittantly
with the increase in information dissemination, there has been
an increase in the debate between the interests of individuals and
the interests of the public in that information. In this context,
lies the growing debate regarding access to the information
presented to and filed with the courts. Most precedent in this
area is found at the state level and by the federal courts of
appeals. 10 7 Generally, rights to access judicial processes are dif-
ferentiated based on whether access is sought to a proceeding,
trial or hearing before ajudge, or to judicial records, the various
papers and other forms of information generated and collected
through court procedures. Controversies concerning informa-
tion are divided between the rights to access the information and
the rights to use or disseminate the information.
Most of the access controversies to come before the courts
have involved criminal matters. In criminal cases, depending
upon the type of proceeding, access and use are afforded and
protected through the First Amendment and the common
law.1" 8 In bankruptcy cases, access and use are afforded and pro-
106. One author notes that this could result in the prosecution of inno-
cent users. See Haeji Hong, Hacking Through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 31
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 283 (1997).
107. See Louis F. Hubener, Rights of Privacy in Open Courts-Do They Exist?,
2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 189, 191-93 (1989); Arthur R. Miller, Confiden-
tiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REv. 427, 427
n.7, 432-40 (1991). Also, the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to the
judicial branch. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165,
1177 (6th Cir. 1983).
108. For recitation of the history of common law rights regarding access
to judicial proceedings and records, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 565-74 (1980); Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387-91
(1979); Nixon v. Warner Commmunications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 n. 8
(1978).
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tected through statute, rules of procedure and the common law.
As regards civil cases, access rights have been mainly found to
depend upon the common law.
If the level of controversy on a subject reflects the level of
public interest, few people were interested in accessing the great
majority of court records and proceedings until the 1970s. At
that time, jurisprudence concerning access to court information
increased by orders of magnitude over the previous 100 years.
Until the middle 1970s, there were very few published opinions
as regards access to court records and proceedings and just as
few references to such access in statutes and rules. 109 Govern-
ment misuses of secret information, concomitant with the techni-
cal explosion in the ability to record and reference information,
apparently caused an explosion in the desire, and time available,
to seek out information such as that residing in the courts. 110 At
the same time, the courts changed their civil rules of procedure
allowing more discovery and exchange of information between
the parties in a case, thus creating more information which par-
ties would seek access to.111 Procedures, rules and processes
which the courts had evolved over the years for filing and acces-
sing information came under attack in the quest for ever more
information. 2 During this time, the Supreme Court heard an
astounding nine cases involving access to court records or pro-
109. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 267 (1948); Craig v. Har-
ney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); In re Mosher, 248 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1957); In re
Sackett, 136 F.2d 248 (C.C.P.A. 1943); In re Drawbaught, 2 App. D.C. 404
(1894); Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299 (1892); Colescott v. King, 57 N.E. 535
(Ind. 1900); Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 61 N.E.2d 5 (Mass.
1945); Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1894); Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749
(Mich. 1928); Schmedding v. May, 48 N.W. 201 (Mich. 1891); Park v. Detroit
Free Press, 40 N.W. 731 (Mich. 1888); State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn.
1966); Flexmir, Inc. v. Herman, 40 A.2d 799 (N.J. Ch. 1945); Munser v. Blais-
dell, 48 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1944); Allen v. Lackey, 188 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1947); In re
Caswell, 29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893); Youmans v. Owens, 137 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. 1965);
King v. King, 168 P. 740 (Wyo. 1917).
110. See Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse".- The First Amendment
Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RicH. L. Rrv. 237 (1995).
111. See Miller, supra note 108, at 447-63.
112. See id. The attack on state statutes is especially noteworthy. For long-
standing development of procedures and test of release or sealing of informa-
tion, see id. (detailing the evolution of the discovery process to provide more
equal access to justice and an increase in efficiency in case management with
procedures to protect privacy). Included in these rules are recent changes
mandating disclosure of certain information in civil cases for the reasons of
expense and delay reductions, similarly to the requirements currently in bank-
ruptcy cases. See Lloyd Doggett & Michael Mucchetti, Public Access to Public
Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. Rxv. 643 (1991).
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ceedings.' 13 While the number of cases heard on this single area
is large, the specific issues spoken to were fairly narrow, concern-
ing almost exclusively criminal matters.
We will present the current law on availability of court
records derived from these cases as applied to criminal matters
and the derivation from the law regarding criminal cases by the
lower courts of availability of information in civil matters. Then,
we will discuss the current availability in bankruptcy matters. The
history of access to the first two areas is of much longer standing
and provides an interesting context for understanding current
access levels to bankruptcy information.
A. Criminal Prosecutions
Outside of discovery, grand jury proceedings, plea negotia-
tions, jury deliberations and presentence investigative matters a
public right of access to all aspects of criminal prosecutions has
been found. The right to access criminal case proceedings and to
disseminate information from those proceedings is afforded
expansive and strong protection from the First Amendment.
The right of access to judicial records in criminal cases, including
exhibits admitted at trial, and to disseminate information from
the records, is generally afforded less protection at the common
law.
Information gathered in criminal cases takes myriad forms,
including physical samples, furniture, documents, recordings as
well as formalized documents such as warrants, indictments,
information, motions, responses, orders andjudgments. The evi-
dentiary discovery materials are not in the physical possession of
the court until admitted at trial. The nature of most of the evi-
dence and content of documents is extremely private, revealing
family relationships, sexual information, medical information
and financial information.
The proceedings held in criminal cases are numerous. Start-
ing with the meetings of the grand jury, these include hearings
on issuance of warrants, probable cause to try, evidentiary sup-
pression hearings, juror voir dire, motions in limine and sentenc-
113. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Waller
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984);
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspapers
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
555; Gannett Co., 443 U.S. 368; Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 589; Cox
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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ing related hearings. A record of any proceedings held before a
judge or magistrate is required. 14
The law of access to criminal case information developed
most rapidly with the trial. The seminal case regarding access to
criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, found both a common law
and First Amendment right that criminal trials be open and
accessible to the public. 5 Further refinement of the expression
of this right by the Supreme Court in the Globe Newspaper case
specified that only a most stringent, strict scrutiny test would
overcome the First Amendment right."1 6 These discussions were
extended in the Press Enterprise cases to include open access to
the voir dire of jurors in criminal cases and open access to prob-
able cause preliminary hearings in criminal cases.1 17
The reasoning given for access to criminal proceedings rests
upon two bases. These bases are set forth in the opinion and
various concurrences in Richmond Newspapers. The reasoning of
the divided court in Richmond Newspapers has been restated in
subsequent opinions by the Court and has been much analyzed
by commentators. In the plurality opinion and several concur-
rences, the justices found that criminal trials had historically
been an open institution in American government.11 8 As a sec-
ond basis for finding a First Amendment right to open criminal
trials, the justices found, particularly Justice Brennan in his con-
currence in judgment, an unstated but structurally necessary
component of the Constitution to informed suffrage and partici-
pation in government. The justices found a First Amendment
right to access government information and processes to the
extent necessary to both evaluate government operations, a type
of informed suffrage, and to contribute to the process or opera-
tion itself, where public access brings independent contributions
to the operation.19 The Court found the elements of historical
practice, informed suffrage and an independent contribution to
the criminal trial from the presence of the public in the court-
room to be present in its determination that the right of access
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1994).
115. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555.
116. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607-08.
117. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 501; Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 1.
118. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 567-73.
119. See id. at 575-80 (speaking to effects of publicity on witnesses and
prosecutors as well as analogies to system of checks and balances); Gannett Co.,
Inc., v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 421 (Blackmun,J., concurring and dissenting) ("It
is not surprising, therefore, that both Hale and Blackstone, in identifying the
function of publicity at common law, discussed the open-trial requirement not
in terms of individual liberties but in terms of the effectivenes of the trial pro-
cess."); Cerrutti, supra note 110.
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extended to criminal trials as civic exercises or government
operations. 12
°
These aspects of the First Amendment right were further
clarified in Globe Newspaper.'21 After refining the right, the Court
found, in the context of a mandatory closure statute, that the
denial of access to a criminal trial must be necessitated by a com-
pelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. 122 The findings in this opinion, as well as those follow-
ing, seem to point to the validity of a case by case determination
of the necessity of closure for privacy, fair trial or other constitu-
tional grounds.1 23 Lower courts, using mostly the second portion
of the analyses of Richmond and the strict scrutiny of Globe have
extended the First Amendment right to access criminal trials to
other aspects of criminal cases.' 24
The right to disseminate information heard or seen at a
criminal trial appears clear. The Supreme Court has consistently
found a First Amendment right to disseminate even sensitive
information if it was disclosed at a criminal trial or other criminal
proceeding. 25 The right to have physical access to exhibits or
copies of exhibits admitted at criminal trials or proceedings is
less clear.' 26 The Court in Nixon, found that any right to access
exhibits and other judicial records is found, if present at all,
under the common law and no First Amendment right to access
this type of information exists.' 27
120. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 594-96 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (finding action of judge at trial to be a form of lawmaking).
121. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604-06.
122. See id. at 607-08.
123. See id. at 608 ( "Such an approach ensures that the constitutional
right of the press and public to gain access to criminal trials will not be
restricted except where necessary to protect the State's interest.").
124. See id.
125. See Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Oklahoma Publ'g Co.
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492, 496 (1975);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1965); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 523 (1965);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
126. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978);
United States v. Kaczynski, 154 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.
McDougal, 103 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 1996); In re CBS, Inc., 828 F.2d 958 (2d Cir.
1987); United States v. Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1985); Belo Broad.
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981); In re National Broad. Co., 653 F.2d
609 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); In re
National Broad. Co., 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980);
127. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608-09. See also Los Angeles Police Dep't v.
United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 120 S.Ct. 483 (1999). For a civil case holding
no First Amendment right to access government records, see Calder v. Internal
Revenue Serv., 890 F.2d 781, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Houchins v. KQED,
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Rights to access court records in criminal matters are about
as clear as that to access exhibits at trial. The Supreme Court has
not visited this specific area. The various courts of appeal are very
divided over the source of rights to access judicial records in
criminal cases. Some circuits find a First Amendment right to
access criminal records and others find only a common law
right. 128
Of all judicial proceedings, criminal cases are truly unique.
While the defendant is a private citizen, the public is always the
prosecutor. Violation of the criminal law affects the continuance
of society and thus places the public as a victim/party in the suit
with their champion, the prosecutor. Indeed, criminal matters
are so important to the function of our society and government
that they may only be brought by a government entity, through
its agent. The case also may only be heard by a judge, a govern-
ment functionary. Where in a civil matter, the parties may nego-
tiate among themselves or use outside private parties to mediate
or arbitrate their dispute, no private party may bring or hear a
criminal case. Indeed, vigilante justice against supposed
criminals is itself a crime.
B. Civil Suits
The extent and protection of rights in information from
civil matters is more ill-defined than that for criminal matters.
Most of the precedent in this area comes from the courts of
appeal as only one issue regarding access and dissemination
rights in civil matters has reached the Supreme Court. The
rationale of the courts varies widely. Notwithstanding these dif-
ferences, rights to access civil case proceedings and records, and
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)) ("There is no constitutional right to have access to
particular government information, or to require openness from the bureau-
cracy.... The public's interest in knowing about its government is protected by
the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution
itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act."). See
also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986).
128. See United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1989); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989); In re Search Warrant for
Secretarial Area, 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988); In re New York Times Co., 828
F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir.
1986); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Peters, 754 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Santarelli, 729 F.2d 1388
(11 th Cir. 1984); Associated Press, Inc. v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d
1143 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burka, 289 A.2d 376 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
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to disseminate information accessed, appear to be based upon
the common law, except in the Third Circuit. 129
The physical information and proceedings to which the pub-
lic seeks access, and the parties' privacy, include information
gathered by the parties, some of which is brought to the court
and some not, and information generated by the court. The
information brought before the court is determined by rules of
procedure promulgated by the judiciary and localjudges. These
rules are organized along three broad areas: pretrial documents
and proceedings, trial procedures and documents and post-trial
documents and proceedings.
Pretrial rules allow the parties to gather a great deal of infor-
mation. The general types of materials and records generated
through these rules and statutes primarily consist of what are
known as discovery materials. Discovery materials include copies
of original documents of the litigants, written answers to ques-
tions and stipulations of fact, as well as transcripts of depositions,
face to face question sessions. The more formalized documents
which may be filed at this stage also include motions, applica-
tions, responses, answers, the complaint and answer, objections,
notices and orders. Federal civil rules detail the format, and to
some extent the content, of the complaint and any answer or
responsive motion."' 0 The rules require the names of the liti-
gants be revealed by placing them on the complaint and subse-
quent pleadings. 3
The majority of hearings held at this stage concern disputes
over exchange of discovery information. Many hearings are also
held concerning various motions to proceed without a trial, such
as motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.
At the trial, information gathering has stopped and the pres-
entation of relevant and admissible portions of that information
takes place. The results of all that has transpired through pre-
trial proceedings are presented to the judge and jury. Tran-
scripts and recordings along with any physical evidence are
gathered as the records of the trial.
Post-trial information gathered includes motions, responses,
objections, notices and orders along with appellate briefs. The
types, format and some content of subsequent documents
129. See Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d
653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.
1984).
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3 & 5.
131. See FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a) & 7(b)(2).
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through post-trial actions are also set forth.132 The format of
these documents is dictated by rules of procedure.
In addition to mandating the type and format of informa-
tion presented to the court, requirements for court generated
records are also set forth in rules of procedure. A docket and the
chronologic index of all documents and hearings, must be
kept. 133 A separate chronologic index of judgments must be
kept by the court.1 4 Orders, notices and judgments generated
by the court must also be filed and conform with format require-
ments in the rules of procedure. Physical evidence presented at
trial must be kept with the court, usually for a limited time. 135
Almost all of the information gathered during these three
stages is filed with the court or presented at the trial. Settlement
negotiations and related materials, juror names and deliberation
transcripts or materials, and judges' notes are the few areas
where filings of transcripts and materials are not required.'3 6
Finally, transcripts or electronic recordings must be kept of every
hearing or trial." 7
The law of access to this information is not as clear as most
would like it to be. While a rule of procedure affords the public
access to trials on the merits before a judge, no bright line tests
of access rights to other proceedings and information have
evolved and decisions rest on required case by case application of
judicial case management rules.138
The analysis used by the majority of courts in civil cases to
determine access rights to either judicial records or proceedings
hinges on the limited findings and language of the Supreme
Court in two cases, Nixon v. Warner Communications and Seattle
Times v. Rhinehart, both of which specifically involve judicial
records. 3 9 A small minority of courts use the reasoning found in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia in analyzing civil case access,
relying on dicta found in a footnote in that case. 4 '
132. See FED. R. Clv. P. 5 & 10. See Fed. R. App. P. 27-32.
133. See FED. R. Civ. P. 79.
134. See FED. R. Civ. P. 58 & 79.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
136. See United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210-1211 (5th Cir.
1977). However, settlement agreements and orders in class actions must be
filed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e). See Miller, supra note 107, at 427.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 753(b).
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 77(b).
139. See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
140. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17
(1980) ("Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a ques-
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Although provided the opportunity, the Supreme Court has
not found any First Amendment right of public access in civil
cases. Instead, the court found in Nixon that no First Amend-
ment public right to copy exhibits in civil trials exists.141 In Seattle
Times, the Court found no First Amendment right of litigants to
access or disseminate information accessed solely through court
rules to try a civil case. This reluctance on the part of the Court
to extend First Amendment rights of access to civil cases appears
to have acted as a negative precedent upon lower courts, as only
an extremely small minority have extended any form of constitu-
tional level access rights to civil cases.
The lower courts have made limited findings as regards
rights of access to civil case proceedings. Two circuit courts of
appeals have found a right of the public to access civil trials
under the First Amendment.14 2 Two other circuit courts of
appeal have found a First Amendment right of public access lim-
ited solely to certain proceedings, civil trials regarding prisoners
and contempt hearings. 143 Finally, to complicate the picture fur-
ther, three circuit courts reaching the issue of public access to
civil trials have found such a right to exist under the common
law. 144
The lower courts have, however, unanimously found a com-
mon law public right to access some aspects of civil case informa-
tion, 145 following an acknowledgment in Nixon that "[i]t is clear
that the courts of this country recognize a general right to
inspect and copy public records and documents, including judi-
cial records and documents.' 46 The courts have established
boundaries to that right based upon judicial supervisory powers
and interests, again quoting from Nixon:
tion not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal
trials have been presumptively open.").
141. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608-09.
142. See Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir.1985)
(applying First Amendment level test as regards access to civil trial and sealing
of trial records.); Westmoreland v. C.B.S., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984);
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).
143. See In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658 (8th
Cir. 1984) (contempt hearings); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir.
1983) (civil trials regarding prisoners).
144. See Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 898 F.2d 1371
(8th Cir. 1990); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983); Woven Elec. Corp. v. Advance Group,
Inc., 930 F.2d 913 (4th Cir 1991) 1991 WL 54118 (unpublished disposition).
145. See, e.g., Webster Groves, 898 F.2d at 1376-77; Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1568;
Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1177-80; Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d
1295 (7th Cir. 1980).
146. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (footnotes omitted).
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It is uncontested, however, that the right to inspect and
copy judicial records is not absolute. Every court has
supervisory power over its own records and files, and access
has been denied where court files might have become a
vehicle for improper purposes. For example, the common-
law right of inspection has bowed before the power of a
court to insure that its records are not "used to gratify pri-
vate spite or promote public scandal" through the publica-
tion of "the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a
divorce case." Similarly, courts have refused to permit
their files to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for
press consumption, or as sources of business information
that might harm a litigant's competitive standing.
1 4 7
Applications of these boundaries are made in individual cases
through the trial judge, as "[t]he decision as to access is one best
left to the sound discretion of the trail court, a discretion to be
exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case.' 48
The findings of the majority of circuit courts also include
elements of the analysis found in Seattle Times, where the
Supreme Court dealt with the rights of litigants in a civil case to
access and disseminate discovery records. The opinion did not
specifically reach to other types of judicial records generated in
civil cases, to any pretrial proceedings or the civil trial itself, or to
any rights of the public to access records in civil cases.14 9 Follow-
ing the criteria set out in Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia,15 0
the Court found first that no long standing practice of open pub-
lic access to discovery practices and filed materials exists.15 1 The
Court also found that the only source of access rights to the
information is through court discovery processes, "a matter of
legislative grace."1 52 Finally, the Court found that public access
rights offer a significant potential for abuse.'55 Based on this
analysis, the Court held that no First Amendment or common
147. Id. at 598 (quoting In re Caswell, 18 A. 259, 293 (R.I. 1893)).
148. Id, at 599 (footnotes omitted).
149. See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
150. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
151. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33-35. An exception to this practice is
specifically set forth in the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C.
§ 30 (1997) (depositions in cases brought by the government under the Sher-
man Act are open to the public).
152. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32.
153. See id. at 33-35 (finding of potential for abuse in public access and
dissemination of discovery information is contrary to the finding of a structural
contribution by public access to criminal trials).
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law right of litigants exists to access or disseminate information
acquired solely due to court rules of procedure. 154
In addition to the findings and analysis discussed above,
courts and commentators have looked to the purposes of gather-
ing information in civil cases, and the reasons for bringing it to
the court, in analyzing access issues. Again, Nixon and Seattle
Times are often cited. 155 Although not couched in these terms,
the courts generally find that the public and litigants cannot pig-
gyback on the discovery process to gain access rights they would
not have otherwise. Citing to the results in Nixon, the courts then
reason that just because the courts act as custodian of informa-
tion does not mean the public has a First Amendment right to
that information.
This line of analysis finds that the function of the judicial
system, to which access is sought, is not to gather information for
public consumption, but for "the sole purpose of assisting in the
preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. 1
56
These courts find that just because there is a public interest, "[i] t
does not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unre-
strained right to disseminate information that has been obtained
through pretrial discovery, 1 5 7 and the Supreme Court, "has
never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access
to all sources of information within government control. 1 58
With these bases in mind, the law of access to judicial
records in civil cases has evolved in an equally fragmented man-
ner. Only a very small minority of courts has found a right of
public access under the First Amendment." 9 As discussed previ-
ously, lower federal courts have, however, unanimously found a
right of public access under the common law. 6' Whether find-
ing a First Amendment or common law right, the majority of
154. See id. at 32.
155. See id. at 20; Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978).
156. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34; See also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893
(2d Cir. 1982) ("[d]iscovery involves the use of compulsory process to facilitate
orderly preparation for trial, not to educate or titillate the public"); A. Miller,
supra note 107, at 441. ("Nor does the mere use of governmental processes to
gather information generally create a First Amendment right of public access to
the information collected.").
157. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 31.
158. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978).
159. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994);
Enprotech Corp. v. Randa, 983 F.2d 17 (3d 1993); Brown v. Advantage Eng'g,
Inc., 960 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992); Littlejohn v. Bic Corp., 851 F.2d 673 (3d
Cir. 1988); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988);
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986).
160. See supra note 144.
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courts have limited the definition of judicial records, and thus
the scope of any right, to a subset of the records actually in the
court's possession. Distinctions used to define the subsets have
been drawn based on the dispositive relationship of the records
to substantive rights and to the temporal relationship of the
records to any judgment.
So what is a judicial record? Is it all records in the physical
possession of the court or some limited type of those records? Is
it all records in possession of the court after judgment has been
rendered, no matter the type? 61
The lower federal courts appear to have answered these
questions by looking to the relevancy and use of the materials,
judicial records, in coming to a dispositive ruling and by defining
which operations of the court in private disputes are governmen-
tal and which materials necessary to evaluate the judicial system.
The facts and issues analyzed illustrate a balancing of privacy
concerns of litigants with the public right to evaluate government
operations. 162
One circuit has set a bright line test, and in so doing, the
court has found that all materials are relevant to public review of
the judicial system. In the Third Circuit, all materials in the phys-
ical possession of the court are defined as judicial records and
the public enjoys a First Amendment right of access to all judicial
records unless the materials are properly held under seal.16
The vast majority of the other eleven circuits have been
much more circumspect regarding the definition of judicial
records. These courts define judicial records, not as all materials
held by the court, but only those materials referenced by a judge
or jury in making various rulings.164 These courts find "[t]hat
161. See San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187
F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. EI-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158 (D.C. Cir.
1997); In re Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325
(D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 101 F.R.D. 34, 43
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
162. See EI-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 161-163; Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 893 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("[a]n adjudication is a formal act of government, the basis of which
should, absent exceptional circumstances, be subject to public scrutiny"); Wilk
v. American Med. Ass'n., 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980).
163. See Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 at 782; Enprotech Corp., 983
F.2d 17, 20-21; Littlejohn, 851 F.2d 673; Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust, 800 F.2d at 344-
45; but see Republic of Phillippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653
(3d Cir. 1991) (basing finding of access to summary judgment materials on
common law right and dispositive nature of materials).
164. See EI-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 163; United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141,
145 (2d 1995); EEOC v. Erection Co., Inc., 900 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1990); Rush-
ford v. New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. Cry-
ovac, 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d
20001
1046 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
what makes a document a judicial record and subjects it to the
common law right of access is the role it plays in the adjudicatory
process."
165
Moreover, "[d]ocuments that are preliminary, advisory, or,
for one reason or another, do not eventuate in any official action
or decision being taken" '1 6 6 are not relevant for evaluation of the
judicial system and thus not subject to public access. These
courts follow the reasoning of Justice Holmes:
The chief advantage to the country which we can discern
[from application of the public records privilege to judicial
records] . . . is the security which publicity gives to the
proper administration ofjustice .... It is desirable that the
trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not
because the controversies of one citizen with another are
of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment
that those who administer justice should always act under
the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen
should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the
mode in which a public duty is performed .... [I] t is clear
that [these grounds] have no application whatever to the
contents of a preliminary written statement of a claim or
charge. These do not constitute a proceeding in open
court. Knowledge of them throws no light upon the
administration of justice. Both form and contents depend
wholly on the will of a private individual, who may not be
even an officer of the court.
1 6 7
Even after information is classified as a judicial record, and
thus subject to some level of a public right of access, access may
be limited through protective orders, sealing or redacting infor-
mation, made upon a showing of good cause or an overriding
interest. Limiting access through a finding of good cause gener-
ally involves trade secrets, confidential business information or
improper use.'6 8 Compelling, overriding interests have been
found to include privacy,"' a fair trial,170 "safeguarding the phys-
1302, 1308-10 (7th Cir. 1984); Oklahoma Hosp. Ass'n v. Oklahoma Publ'g Co.,
748 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1984);Joy, 692 F.2d at 880.
165. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 163.
166. Id. at 162 (citing Washington Legal Found. v. United States Sentenc-
ing Com'n, 89 F.3d 897, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
167. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
168. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26 (c)(7).
169. See In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470 (6th Cir.
1983); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th
Cir. 1983).
170. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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ical and psychological well-being of a minor,"171 and protection
of juveniles,17 2 and national security. Most of the findings are
very fact driven. Much has been written about the use and mis-
use of these tools of judicial case management and a complete
discussion of the jurisprudence of these tools is beyond the scope
of this article. 73
As can be seen, the basis for access to criminal versus civil
proceedings and records lie in the government nature of the
case.' 74 Criminal cases are essential government functions with
the public involved in three ways: as a secondary victim; through
its agent, the prosecutor; and its agent, the judge. Civil cases
have fewer public/governmental components. They generally
do not involve the government, thus the public, as a party. The
functionaries subject to public scrutiny in a civil case are essen-
tially the judges. Because of this low level of government pres-
ence in a civil trial, the courts concentrate scrutiny on the judge
as the primary focus of the right of public access and have lim-
ited access to those proceedings where a judge is present making
substantive findings, and to those materials which show how the
judge is administering a case and upon which the judge relies to
make those substantive findings.
C. Proceedings in Bankruptcy
The extent of rights in information concerning bankruptcy
courts is found in statutes and rules of procedure. There is little
case law and most courts have not had to rule on First Amend-
ment or common law access rights issues.
171. Id. at 607 n.19.
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a), (c) & (e) (1994).
173. See Fitzgerald, Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System Going Secretly Pri-
vate, 6J.L. & PoL'Y 381 (1990); Lloyd et al., Public Access to Public Courts: Discour-
aging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REv. 643 (1991); Miller, supra note
107.
174. "Arguably, the public interest in securing the integrity of the fact
finding process is greater in the criminal context than the civil context, since
the condemnation of the state is involved in the former, but not the latter." In
re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983).
For the purpose of civil litigation, courts exist chiefly as a public ser-
vice to persons who cannot work out their private disputes and need
the intervention of an unbiased entity to help bring the controversy to
an end. Briefly stated, the public interest in civil litigation is mainly
that these private disputes be concluded peacefully, fairly and without
too much cost to society as a whole.
Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1992)
(Edmondson, J., dissenting).
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The information and proceedings before a bankruptcy court
to which the public seeks access are divided into three main
areas, pursuant to various statutes and rules. 7 5 These areas are
distinguished by the level ofjudicial involvement, the presence of
adverse parties and the need for actual litigation process. The
first of these areas, "a case under title 11," for our purposes the
"main bankruptcy case," consists primarily of uncontested appli-
cations and administrative procedures unique to the bankruptcy
code, which mostly proceed by operation of law. 176 The second
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994) (distinguishes four types of matters in
bankruptcy and grants original jurisdiction to the district court over these
matters):
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive juris-
diction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district
courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil pro-
ceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under
title 11.
The district court is allowed to refer any part, or all, of this grant ofjurisdiction
to bankruptcy judges, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994), with reservation
or limitations to jurisdiction further refined by exceptions to several types of
civil suits, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) & (c) (1994):
(b) (5) The district court shall order that personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district court in which the
bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district in
which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the
bankruptcy case is pending.
(c) (1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a case
under title 11 but is otherwise related to a case under title 11.
176. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303, 501-503 & 521 (1994). "Section 1334 lists
four types of matters over which the district court has jurisdiction: (1) 'cases
under title 11,' (2) 'proceedings arising under title 11,' (3) proceedings 'arising
in' a case under title 11, and (4) proceedings 'related to a case under title 11.'
The first category refers merely to the bankruptcy petition itself, filed pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 or 303." In reWood, 825 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1987).
See also In reWolverine Radio Co., 930 F.2d 1132, 1141 (6th Cir. 1991). Accord-
ing to the 1983 Advisory Committee Notes of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, applications are requests for relief requiring judicial consideration
but not involving adverse parties; applications include requests for: permission
to pay filing fee in installments (Rule 1006(b) (1)), appointment of a creditor's
committee (Rule 2007(a)), employment of a professional person (Rule
2014(a)), entry of final decree (Rule 2015(a)(6)), compensation for services
rendered (Rule 2016(a)), notice as to criminal contempt (Rule 9020(a) (2)),
removal (Rule 9027(a)), and shortening periods of notice (Rule 9006(d)). See
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9013 (advisory committee notes).
This portion of a case under title 11, opening bankruptcy papers, applica-
tions and voluntarily filed forms, has been found to consist of a legal remedy
which does not rise to a suit in law. Courts reason that this part of the proceed-
ings is not a suit because no damages are sought, there is no opposing party
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area consists of proceedings arising under tide 11 called "con-
tested matters" which are not civil suits, as that term has been
defined by the courts, but involve adverse parties and the consid-
eration of a judge. 177 The third area consists of "adversary pro-
ceedings" which are civil suits involving some area of bankruptcy,
or nonbankruptcy, law.1 7' The proceedings and materials held
by the court in each area and, arguably, the levels of public
access afforded to them, differ.
The information generated in the main bankruptcy case and
contested matters includes documents required of the debtor,
motions and claims filed by creditors, applications, orders releas-
ing liens and abandoning some property, as well as court gener-
ated administrative notices and court generated orders dis-
charging the debtor and closing the case. The content and types
of documents generated are mandated by statutes and rules.1 79
Official forms are provided for most of these documents.1 80
It is the main bankruptcy case which generates the informa-
tion most at issue in this article. As discussed previously, the con-
tent of the forms filed in a bankruptcy case includes extensive,
private, financial and demographic information concerning
debtors. Information in a main bankruptcy case concerning
against whom redress is sought, and compulsory process is not issued. See In re
Barrett Ref. Corp., 221 B.R. 795 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998); In re Psychiatric
Hosps. of Fla., Inc., 216 B.R. 660 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998); Texas v. Walker, 142
F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 1998).
177. See FED R. BAN R. P. 9014, 1018. See also In re Wolverine, 930 F.2d at
1144 (citing In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 96-97).
178. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (listing ten such proceedings). According
to the 1983 Advisory Committee Notes, adversary proceedings are actual dis-
putes involving adverse parties which involve litigation requiring process as in
any civil suit. They include some disputes arising under title 11 and some dis-
putes arising under nonbankruptcy law which are related to a case under title
11.
Courts find adversary proceedings to be civil suits. See, e.g., In re Mitchell,
222 B.R. 877 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Doiel, 228 B.R. 439 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1998); In
re Mueller, 211 B.R. 737, 741 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997); In reCreative Goldsmiths
of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
179. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (regarding the petition to be filed); 11
U.S.C. § 501 (1994) (listing of creditors and schedule of assets and liabilities,
schedule of current income and expenditures and a statement of financial
affairs); 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1994) (statement of intentions with respect to reten-
tion and surrender of secured property); 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994) (list of prop-
erty claimed exempt from the estate); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106 & 1107 (1994) (reports
on assets and operations); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1221 & 1321 (1994) (filing a
plan); FED. R. BANI'KR. P. 1002-1004; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1005; FED. R. BANKR. P.
1007; FED. R. BANKR. P. 4002.
180. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 (requires use of official forms which are
allowed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075).
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creditors includes creditor name and address, and the nature
and amount of the debt owed.
There is little historical information concerning the basis for
inclusion of the various types of information required of the
debtor in bankruptcy documents. Most of the information
required is relevant to identification of debtors, location of assets
and determination of debtors' financial condition. Courts have
found the need for the information disclosed to aid creditors in
identifying the debt owed and determining debtors' ability to
pay, to identify estate assets and to identify possible bankruptcy
fraud.18'
The provision of social security numbers on the petition is of
some controversy. Several courts have recited protection of cred-
itors as the primary reason for requiring the numbers. 182 These
courts find that social security numbers are necessary to protect
creditor due process rights by helping the creditor identify the
debtor, thus allowing them to identify the debt owed and file any
necessary proofs of claim or take other actions, and by helping
creditors and other entities in the bankruptcy system to identify
serial filers, locate unlisted assets or find other instances of bank-
ruptcy fraud. 183
Adversary proceedings generate the same type of records as
in any civil suit. Some of these records are composed of discov-
ery materials as discussed previously for a civil suit.
181. See In re Laws, 223 B.R. 714 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998) (debtor sought to
use alternate address; court found could only seal address when debtor is
threatened by assault).
182. See In reAdair, 212 B.R. 171 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997); In re Anderson,
159 B.R. 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993); In reAustin, 46 B.R. 358 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1985).
183. Notwithstanding this reasoning, the Bankruptcy Code provides that
the name, address and social security number/tax identification number of
debtor if omitted from the Notice of Commencement of Case and First Meeting
of Creditors does not invalidate the legal effect of that notice. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 342 (1994). See also 140 CONG. REc. H10752-01, H10759 (1994):
This section amends section 342 of the Bankruptcy Code to require
that notices to creditors set forth the debtor's name, address, and tax-
payer identification (or social security) number. The failure of a
notice to contain such information will not invalidate its legal effect,
for example, such failure could not result in a debtor failing to obtain
a discharge with respect to a particular creditor.
The Committee anticipates that the Official Bankruptcy Forms
will be amended to provide that the information required by this sec-
tion will become a part of the caption on every notice given in a bank-
ruptcy case. As with other similar requirements, the court retains the
authority to waive this requirement in compelling circumstances, such
as those of a domestic violence victim who must conceal her residence
for her own safety.
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Most of the information generated in a bankruptcy case or
adversary proceedings is required to be filed with the court.'1 4
The court is required to keep a docket composed of chronologic
entries of activity, orders and judgments.' A separate docket of
creditor claims, the claims register, is also required of the
court.186  Copies of judgments and orders are also kept.18 1
Finally, if a transcript or recording of a proceeding before a
bankruptcy judge is made, it must be filed as well.'88
The need for a place to file the information required for the
various parts of a bankruptcy case, and a place for parties and the
public to review the information, is self-evident. The reasoning
for placing the courts as the repository for all information,
except tapes of the meeting of creditors, appears to be based on
happenstance, rather than on use of the information by the
court. There was no other entity at the time the bankruptcy code
was enacted to give the duty to.'8 9 The U.S. Trustee's Office was
too new and experimental. No one knew if it would succeed, and
it had no office space to store documents or space to offer public
access to review the documents.
Proceedings before a bankruptcy judge in a main bank-
ruptcy case are rare. The debtor is required to appear at least
once at a meeting of creditors; however, this meeting is a man-
dated deposition and not a proceeding as courts have used that
term in civil or criminal cases.'9 0 This meeting is presided over
184. See supra note 182.
185. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5003(a).
186. See id. 5003(b).
187. See id. 5003(c).
188. See id. 5007.
189. The 1977 Report of the Commission of Bankruptcy Laws recom-
mended that all petitions be filed with the yet to be created Office of the
United States Trustee. The House version of the bill did not specify a place to
file petitions. See H.R. REP. No. 595-321 (1977). The Senate version specified
filing petitions with the bankruptcy judge. The current provisions at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 301-303 appear a practical compromise. See S. REP. No. 989-31 (1978). In
addition, the House and Senate reports indicate that, other than the opening
documents related to the petition, all other post-petition documents were to be
filed with the court.
190. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 341-43 (1994). 11 U.S.C. § 341 (c) states that "[t]he
court may not preside at, and may not attend, any meeting under this section
including any final meeting of creditors." Some of the reasoning behind this
procedure is found in the House Report:
In keeping with the thrust of the bill to remove the bankruptcy judge
from administrative matters and not to involve him in situations where
he will hear evidence outside of the context of a dispute that he must
decide, the bankruptcy judge will not be the presiding officer at the
meeting, and will not be authorized to question the debtor as he is
today. If there were to be any disputes resolved there, the judge might
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by an employee of the Office of the United States Trustee, part
of the Department of Justice, or a case trustee, who is appointed
by a United States Trustee. The trustee and creditors depose the
debtor and a recording, which is kept at the local office of the
U.S. Trustee, is made of the meeting.19 ' Subsequent depositions
and requests for documents of debtors, and some entities, are
also allowed and procedures for compelling attendance and pro-
duction are provided.'92 Involvement of a bankruptcy judge in
these depositions is extremely rare.
If a dispute of a cause under the bankruptcy code, a con-
tested matter, does arise, pleadings are filed with the court.
Some of the discovery information acquired through examina-
tions of the debtor and other entities may be presented to the
court as exhibits to a motion. A hearing or trial may actually be
held before a bankruptcy judge.
In adversary proceedings, the same type of proceedings are
held before a bankruptcy judge, or in some instances a district
judge, as in any civil suit.'93 Most of the rules of procedure used
in a civil suit before the district court apply also to an adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy court, including especially the pretrial
discovery rules.' 94 Adversary proceedings receive a court case
number separate from the court number given the main bank-
ruptcy case.
be present, but will not be present for the examination of the debtor,
as this has caused too many problems of the dispute-decider hearing
inadmissable evidence.
H.R. REP. No. 595-331 (1977).
191. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(c) (Record of Meeting):
Any examination under oath at the meeting of creditors held pursu-
ant to § 341 (a) of the Code shall be recorded verbatim by the United
States trustee using electronic sound recording equipment or other
means of recording, and such record shall be preserved by the United
States trustee and available for public access until two years after the
conclusion of the meeting of creditors. Upon request of any entity,
the Unites States trustee shall certify and provide a copy or transcript
of such record at the entity's expense.
192. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 (allowing examination of debtor and enti-
ties with respect of acts, conduct, property, liabilities and the financial condi-
tion of the debtor); FED. R. BANKRa. P. 2005 (compelling attendance).
193. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994),jurisdiction to hear disputes
and cases is referred to the bankruptcy judges by an order of district court.
This reference may be withdrawn upon motion and order by the district court.
See id. § 157(d). The referral is withdrawn by operation of law for causes includ-
ing personal injury torts, wrongful death suits and disputes involving matters of
interstate commerce, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (5) & (d).
194. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7002-7071.
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The history of public access to the various types of processes
and proceedings in bankruptcy is not well chronicled. However,
the evolution of general bankruptcy principles and practices is,
and may shed some light on why a proceeding may or may not
need to, or have been, public.
The principles upon which bankruptcy is based have devel-
oped along with increases in trade and economic advances. Over
the ages, debt has been abhorred and incurring debt has been
considered a dishonest act, while becoming bankrupt has been
considered a criminal act.'95 This belief in the criminal nature of
failure to pay one's debts arose from practices in ancient societies
and religious teachings against any form of usury. 1 9 6 These laws
began to be lifted in the late middle ages; however, bans on
money lending were not fully removed by the Catholic Church
until 1836 and still exist under Islam. 97 In light of the religious
beliefs against usury, secular punishment and treatment of debt-
ors have been harsh and parralled criminal punishment and
prosecution procedures."9 '
The influence of this tradition is still present under both
English and American laws today. However, beginning in 1898,
and expanding in 1978, American bankruptcy law began to break
with the old traditions of treating debtors as criminals1 99 and two
195. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the
United States, 3 AM. BsaNi. INST. L. REV. 5, 8-12 (1995) (quoting Blackstone):
"[T] he law holds it to be an unjustifiable practice, for any person but a
trader to encumber himself with debts of any considerable value. If a
gentleman, or one in a liberal profession, at the time of contracting
his debts, has a sufficient fund to pay them, the delay of payment is a
species of dishonesty, and a temporary injustice to his creditor: and if,
at such time, he has no sufficient fund, the dishonesty and injustice is
the greater."
196. See JAMES D. DAVIDSON & LORD WILLIAM REES-MoGG, THE GREAT
RECKONING 231-34 (1993) (portraying an interesting exposition on the conflu-
ence of religious practices and economics).
197. See Tabb, supra note 195, at 12 (quoting Blackstone):
"A bankrupt... was formerly considered merely in the light of a crimi-
nal .... But at present the laws of bankruptcy are considered as laws
calculated for the benefit of trade, and founded on the principles of
humanity as well as justice: and to that end they confer some privi-
leges, not only on the creditors, but also on the debtor or bankruptcy
himself."
See also DAVIDSON & REES-MOGG, supra note 192.
198. Punishments included imprisonment, death, appearance on
demand and others. See Tabb, supra note 195, at 7-12.
199. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15
BANKR. DEv.J. 321, 328 (1999) ("Unlike the almost punitive British system, the
1898 Act was repeatedly defended as protecting the 'honest but unfortunate'
debtor."); Tabb, supra note 195, at 5.
20001
1054 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
factions developed.2"' The first is composed of those who focus
on bankruptcy law as an avenue to punish criminals, who happen
to be called debtors.201 The second, reformist faction, allows for
the existence of fraudulent, criminal debtors, but sees bank-
ruptcy law as an avenue to return the majority of unfortunates,
called debtors, to contributing members of society.20 2
There is no question that early American principles of bank-
ruptcy law were derived from the English, old tradition system. 20 3
That system was first codified some 400 years ago, and began with
allowance for only discretionary, quasi-criminal examinations of
witnesses by the court, solely for the purpose of investigating sus-
pected fraudulent debtors.20 4 Contrary to the voluminous histor-
ical information concerning public access to criminal
proceedings under early English law, historical information con-
cerning access to bankruptcy proceedings is conspicuously
absent and general historical information does not indicate
whether any proceedings were open to the public. Information
200. These two factions still exist and are very active today. See Responses of
Honorable Edith H. Jones to Follow-up Questions of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. RP.
169, 171 (1998) (referring to abuses by debtors generally and the decline of the
"moral stigma of bankruptcy").
201. See Tabb, supra note 195, at 8 ("The premise of debtor misconduct as
the basis for involuntary bankruptcy, rather than financial status, remained in
place until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was enacted.").
202. See Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress?: A Political
History of Bankruptcy Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 355-57
(1999) (quoting H. H. Shelton, Bankruptcy Law, its History and Purpose, 44 AM. L.
REv. 394, 401 (1910) and then the 1890 Report of the House Judiciary
Committee):
Countless debtors throughout our country were laboring under
the burden of debt, and the debt-laden man has little ambition to
accumulate, or to succeed as the world views success. His energies do
not play freely, his family suffers, and he is not in position to render
either the State or society efficient service....
It is a matter of public concern that every citizen should have an
opportunity to pursue the calling for which he is best adapted and in
the way and under the circumstances which will enable him to be as
large a producer as possible, to the end that the aggregate wealth of
the community in which he lives may be increased. When a man has
paid his honest debts to the extent of the distribution of his property,
it becomes a matter of public concern that he should be released from
his indebtedness.
203. As Justice Holmes stated, "We take our bankruptcy system from Eng-
land, and we naturally assume that the fundamental principles upon which it
was administered were adopted by us when we copied the system." Sexton v.
Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911).
204. 1 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRuPTcY LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 3 (2d ed. 1915).
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on access to bankruptcy papers and pleadings is nonexistent. In
more modern times, a second type of proceeding, a public exam-
ination of the debtor by the English court was instituted.20 5
Under current practice, this examination may be conducted pri-
vately.2 6 The examination, and subsequent investigations under
the English system are akin to a combination full financial audit
and criminal background check, taking several years to
complete.
20 7
As with the English system, historical information as regards
access to American bankruptcy proceedings and materials is lack-
ing. In its beginnings, the American system required an exami-
nation of the debtor by the court where only creditors and
parties in interest could attend.2 8 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
altered this process by requiring a meeting of creditors to be
held before a judge or referee, with judicial discretion as to any
general public access. 209 Later amendments required that this
meeting before the court be public.210
As discussed previously, bankruptcy practice in the last 100
to 150 years, under both English and American laws, has elimi-
nated the presence of the court at the meeting of creditors and
any nonadjudicatory examinations of the debtor or entities. In
addition, these current laws contain provisions that allow waiver
of public examination or provisions that do not expressly require
that the meeting of creditors or examinations be held publicly at
all.2 1
1
While these discovery type proceedings are not required to
be open to the public under current American practice, rights of
the general public and creditors to access hearings and trials
held before a bankruptcy judge are granted directly by a rule of
205. See In re Astri Inv. Manag. & Sec. Corp., 88 B.R. 730, 737 (D. Md.
1988) (citing several sources concerning English laws of that time).
206. I. F. FLETCHER, LAW OF BANKRuprcy (1978).
207. See Skeel, supra note 199, at 171 n.28 and references cited therein.
208. See Bankruptcy Act of 1841, §§ 4 & 7, 5 Stat. 440, 444 & 446 (1841);
Bankruptcy Act of 1800, §§ 18 & 52, 2 Stat. 19, 26 & 34 (1800)
209. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §55, 30 Stat. 544, 559 (1898).
210. Bankruptcy Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 840, 865 (1938). Courts of that
time found that any proceeding before a judge or referee must not be held in
camera. See In re Astri Inv., 88 B.R. at 738-39 and sources therein.
211. For the law of Great Britain, see Insolvency Act of 1976, ch. 60, §6
(1976); FLETCHER, supra note 206, at 112-15. For the laws of the United States,
see 11 U.S.C. §§ 341- 343 (1994); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003-2004. While no men-
tion or requirement of public examination at the first meeting of creditors is
made in the American bankruptcy laws and rules, the recording or transcript of
that meeting is required to made available for public access and copying by the
United States trustee, see FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(c), and a report on the meet-
ing is required to be filed with the court, see FED. R. BANR. P. 2003(d).
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procedure.2" 2 This rule applies to both contested matters and
any adversary proceedings because it refers to any trial or hear-
ing before a bankruptcy judge and does not distinguish between
the various types of proceedings which may be brought before a
bankruptcy judge. Arguably, rights of public access to proceed-
ings before a bankruptcy judge are also provided through the
common law similarly as has been found by the majority of the
courts of appeal to civil proceedings generally.
The issue of public access to bankruptcy proceedings has
not drawn enough contention to result in many published opin-
ions.21 However, in this dearth of dispute, courts in one district
have gone so far as to find that a bankruptcy case, and every
event and proceedings associated with it, rises to the level of a
civil suit and, therefore, the public is afforded a First Amend-
ment right of access.2 4 On that basis, they have found a First
Amendment right of the public to attend the first meeting of
creditors, the administrative proceeding held before an execu-
tive agency, the Department ofJustice, and depositions in preliti-
gation discovery.215 These courts' rather strained support greatly
212. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5001(b) ("All trials and hearings shall be con-
ducted in open court and so far as convenient in a regular court room.").
213. See In re 50-Off Stores, Inc., 213 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (in
camera hearing on retention of professional allowed).
214. See In re Symington, III, 209 B.R. 678, 694 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997)
(2004 examination); In re Astri Inv., 88 B.R. at 736 (meeting of creditors).
215. Contrary to the majority of courts reviewing the issue directly, both
courts find by result that the entity conducting the meeting or examination is
an extension of the court. See In reAstri Inv., 88 B.R. at 740 ("However, the fact
that a United States trustee now presides at creditor's meetings does not change
the essentially judicial character of the proceedings."); see also Symington, 209
B.R. at 694 (finding that 2004 examinations include investigation of matters
related to the substantive discharge rights of the debtor).
Though trustees and examiners are given broad authority under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, and are judicial officers as that term is used to designate any attor-
ney, the majority of courts find that they are not extensions of the court as they
do not adjudicate substantive rights of debtors and creditors. See In re Iono-
sphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Lazar, 28 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993); In reApex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92, 99 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1989); In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314, 316 (S.D. Ohio 1985); In re
Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). But see In re
Continental Airlines, 150 B.R. 334, 342 (D. Del. 1993) (finding fee examiner to
be equivalent to a special master).
In addition, the legislative history of the current provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code removingjudges from presiding at examinations of the debtor also
supports the argument that any trustee and examiners are not extensions of the
court since they are, by negative implication, not a "dispute-decider":
In keeping with the thrust of the bill to remove the bankruptcy judge
from administrative matters and not to involve him in situations where
he will hear evidence outside of the context of a dispute that he must
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exceeds the public access rights found in any civil context and
even exceeds the level of access rights granted the public in the
criminal prosecution process. Even in criminal prosecutions, the
suspect or convicted criminal is not questioned before the public
outside of any appearance as a witness before a judge.
Rights of the public to access all materials held by the court
in a main bankruptcy case are granted directly through the bank-
ruptcy code, as "A paper filed in a case under this title and the
dockets of a bankruptcy court are public records and open to
examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge. '"216
The legislative history behind the rule providing access to hear-
ings and trials and the statute above does not provide any reason-
ing. Lacking any specific historic reference, one commentator
and several courts have commented that the provisions in the
bankruptcy code concerning access to information filed with the
court codify the common law right of public access to judicial
records generally acknowledged in Nixon.21
Several courts have stated that the reasoning for extensive
public access in bankruptcy is based upon the needs for creditor
access and participation in a specific case: "To at least some
extent, this statutory directive for open access flows from the
nature of the bankruptcy process-which is heavily dependent
upon creditor and public participation, and which requires full
financial disclosure of the debtor's affairs."2 ' That same court
continued, "Thus, bankruptcy cases, by their need for creditor
participation and debtor disclosure, are less protective of privacy
and embarrassment concerns than more traditional two party
civil litigation."219
Rights of access to bankruptcy records for the public at
large, not just those creditors with interests in a particular bank-
decide, the bankruptcy judge will not be the presiding officer at the
meeting, and will not be authorized to question the debtor as he is
today. If there were to be any disputes resolved there, the judge might
be present, but will not be present for the examination of the debtor,
as this has caused too many problems of the dispute-decider hearing
inadmissable evidence.
H.R. S 595, 95th Cong. (1997).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1994).
217. See In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994); In re
Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 23 Media L. Rep. 2498 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1995); In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); In re Nunn,
49 B.R. 963, 964 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); COLLIER ON BAN'Rupvrcy 1 107.02
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996).
218. In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 23 Media L. Rep. at
2498.
219. Id. at n.2.
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ruptcy estate, have been found necessary to protect individuals
and businesses who may deal with a debtor after bankruptcy:
A bankruptcy filing is highly pertinent information to com-
mercial enterprises in the geographic area where the
debtor resides. Businesses must make daily decisions about
entering into credit transactions with members of the pub-
lic. The legitimate financial interests of businesses will be
frustrated if the filing of a bankruptcy case is maintained
on a confidential basis. The need of the public to know of
the filing of the bankruptcy case, and the right of the news
media to obtain and publish this information outweighs
the debtors' desire to avoid the embarrassment and diffi-
culties attendant to the filing of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
debtors are not entitled to be protected from publicity
about the filing of the bankruptcy case. 220
Few courts have visited the issue of access to materials in a
main bankruptcy case and contested matters. They have all
upheld the public right of access recited above.221
The few courts faced with an issue regarding public access to
materials in adversary proceedings have applied 11 U.S.C.S.
§107(a) to the materials in those proceedings without discus-
220. In re Laws, 1998 WL 541821, at *715-14 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998).
221. For access to records in a main case, see In re Orion Pictures Corp.,
21 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1994) (licensing agreement in operations of debtor); Sim-
mons v. Deans, 935 F.2d 1287, 1991 WL 106160 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished
disposition) (petition cover sheet); In re Itel Corp., 17 B.R. 942 (9th Cir. BAP
1982) (list of creditors); In re Barney's, Inc., 201 B.R. 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996) (investment proposal); In re Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, 23
Media L. Rep. 2498 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (list of creditors); In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (examiner's records); In re Moramer-
ica Fin. Corp., 158 B.R. 135 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1993) (list of creditors); In re
Lazar, 28 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (examiner's materials); In
re Lomas Fin. Corp., 1991 WL 21231 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (preliminary plan of reor-
ganization); In re Revco D.S., Inc., 18 Media L. Rep. 1591 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1990) (examiner's report); In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1989) (examiner's report and records); In re Nunn, 49 B.R. 963 (Bankr. E.D.
Vir. 1985) (list of creditors); In re Epic Assocs. V, 54 B.R. 445 (Bankr. E.D. Vir.
1985) (list of Creditors); In re Bell & Beckwith, 44 B.R. 661 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984) (list of creditors); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 31 B.R. 53 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1983) (records of 2004 examination). For access to records in contested
proceedings, see In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 226 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D.
N.Y. 1998) (contested application for interim compensation); In re 50-Off
Stores, Inc., 213 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (hearing on contested reten-
tion of professional); In re Continental Airlines, 150 B.R. 334 (D.Del. 1993)
(contested fee application); In re Sherman-Noyes & Prairie Apts. Real Estate
Inv. Partnership, 59 B.R. 905 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (objection to claim); In re
Reliable Investors Corp., 44 B.R. 904 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (contested
motion to convert.
PRIVACY IN THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY COURTS
sion. 2 22 However, as discussed previously, adversary proceedings
are distinguished in 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 1334 & 157 from cases under
tide 11. Interpreting the recitation in 11 U.S.C.S. §10 7 (a) to
"papers in a case under this tide" to include papers in proceed-
ings "related to a case under tide 11," as defined in 28 U.S.C.S.
§§ 1334 & 157, arguably renders these provisions meaningless. It
is thus strongly arguable, that 11 U.S.C.S. §107 does not speak to
adversary proceedings. If so, any right of public access to judicial
records in adversary proceedings, particularly for suits only
related to a case under title 11, arises through the common law
as for any other civil suit.
2 23
Any of these rights of public access to materials in bank-
ruptcy cases or adversary proceedings are subject to some limita-
tions. These limitations include issuance of protective orders,
sealing and redacting materials, and possibly expungement.
Imposition of these limitations is allowed through the bank-
ruptcy code, rules of procedure and the common law. Applica-
tion of these various means to limit access by the courts has been
inconsistent and very fact driven.
First, as Congress giveth it taketh away, by providing in 11
U.S.C.S. §107(b) that papers and records filed in a case under
title 11, may be protected by the bankruptcy court in order to:
"(1) Protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confiden-
tial research, development, or commercial information; or (2)
Protect a person with respect to scandalous or defamatory matter
contained in a paper filed in a case under this title."
The court may limit access to the lists of creditors and list of
equity security holders filed in a main bankruptcy case for cause
shown.2 2 4 In addition, the authority to limit access to certain
information in a main case, which is not produced through a
contested matter and is not filed with the court, has been found
by the courts from several sources.
225
222. See In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); In re
General Homes Corp., 181 B.R. 898 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1995); In re Analytical
Sys., Inc., 83 B.R. 833 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987); In re Hope, 31 B.R. 423 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1984).
223. Of course, in the Third Circuit, this right would rise to one under
the First Amendment.
224. FED. R. BANK. P. 1007(1).
225. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9018:
On motion or on its own initiative, with or without notice, the court
may make any order which justice requires (1) to protect the estate or
any entity In respect of a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information, (2) to protect any entity
against scandalous or defamatory matter contained in any paper filed
in a case under the Code, or (3) to protect governmental matters that
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Limitations on access in contested matters are found
through FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(c), made applicable through FED. R.
BANKR. P. 9014.
There are few published opinions concerning sealing of
materials filed with the court which are generated in main bank-
ruptcy cases or contested matters. The courts that have visited
this area have cited to 107(a) and looked to precedent under
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c) (7) to interpret the language of 107(b) and
the tests to meet under those definitions. 226 Beyond merely seal-
ing a record, debtors have sought to expunge their entire bank-
ruptcy case record.227
Only one Court of Appeals has heard an issue involving
bankruptcy court records. In Orion Pictures, the Second Circuit
stated that §107(a) is a codification of the common law right of
access to court records. 228 The court also found that §107(b)
provides a mandatory list of exceptions to that codified, common
law right of access. 229 Two lower courts have taken this proscrip-
tion farther, finding that the protections afforded under §107(b)
are not merely mandatory, but also exclusive to any other protec-
tions otherwise found at common law.230 Other courts have
found that §107(b) is a codification of merely a portion of the
are made confidential by statute or regulation. If an order is entered
under this rule without notice, any entity affected thereby may move
to vacate or modify the order, and after a hearing on notice the court
shall determine the motion.
See also In re Handy Andy Home Improvement Ctrs., Inc., 199 B.R. 376 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding FED. R. BANK R. P. 9018(1) & (3) to authorize the court
to protect unfiled documents and other information produced through an
uncontested FED. R. BANK. P. 2004 examination); In reApex Oil Co., 101 B.R.
92 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989) (finding that authority to limit access to unfiled
documents in a main case may be found in FED. R. Civ. P. 26, through FED. R.
BANKR. P.9014, only when production is contested). Many other courts have
found the authority in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to limit access to
unfiled materials to apply in main bankruptcy cases whether objections to pro-
duction have been lodged or not. See In re Symington, III, 209 B.R. 678, 685-89
(Bankr. D. Md. 1997); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414, 433-36
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). Other courts have found no authority to limit access to
unfiled materials in a main bankruptcy case exists without objections. See In re
Dinubilo, 177 B.R. 932 (E.D.Cal. 1993); In re DuPont Walston, Inc., 4 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1978).
226. See supra note 221.
227. See In re Cortez, 217 B.R. 538 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997) (applying Fair
Credit Reporting Act); In re Whitener, 57 B.R. 707 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986)
(applying § 107(b) (2)).
228. See In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1994).
229. See id. at 27-28.
230. See In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 B.R. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995).
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protections against access found under the common law. 23 1
These courts find that other bases for limiting access under the
common law remain available.232
The boundaries on limitations to public access to materials
in adversary proceedings are less clear. Depending upon the
applicability of §107 to adversaries, the grounds for limiting
access in both §107(b) and FED. R. BANICR. P. 7026 may apply. If
§107 does not apply to adversaries, then the grounds for limiting
access discussed in the previous section on civil suits, primarily
the definition of judicial records and precedent established
under FED. R. CIv. P. . 26(c) will apply. Several courts, without
referring to any difference between the records held by the court
in a main case and an adversary proceeding, have applied the
precedent of the civil suits as regards the definition of judicial
records.2 3 Sounding much as the courts hearing civil suits,
these courts find that, "The smaller the role documents play in
the adjudicative process, the less of an interest the public has in
them."234
A dichotomy emerges when one compares public access
rights to proceedings in bankruptcy with those rights in civil and
criminal cases. It appears that the public is afforded access rights
to proceedings and records in the main bankruptcy case, and any
associated contested matters, most similar to the level of access
rights found in criminal prosecutions. Public access rights to
proceedings and records in adversary proceedings, however, are
equivalent to those found in civil suits.
In the pre-adjudication phase of each of these three areas of
the law, information gathering, and disputes over that gathering,
predominate. In civil suits, the products of discovery and the
process itself are private between the parties. There is no public
access rights to depositions, which are held privately, nor to
materials, which are often not filed with the court and even if
filed may be outside the scope ofjudicial records subject to pub-
lic access rights. Hearings before a judge, and those materials
231. See In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 226 B.R. 331, 336 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1998); In re 50-Off Stores, Inc., 213 B.R. 646, 659 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1997).
232. See id.
233. See In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 226 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1998); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In reApex Oil
Co., 101 B.R. 92, 99 n.10 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989) ("the Underlying Documents
are not judicial records in that they have not been filed and they are not being
used by proponents in the resolution of substantive legal rights"); In re Sher-
man-Noyes & Prairie Apts. Real Estate Inv. Partnership, 59 B.R. 905 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1986).
234. In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. at 102.
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the judge uses to make substantive findings, are subject only to a
common law right of public access, which is limited by both the
court's ability to seal for good cause and the possibility of a find-
ing of constitutional interests overriding the interests of the pub-
lic to know.
In criminal prosecutions, the products of discovery and the
process itself are private. Depositions, interrogations and other
forms of questioning, while compelled, are still held outside of
the public eye. Materials found through investigations are, as
with most civil discovery materials, not filed with or held by the
court. The various hearings held before a judge at this point are
numerous, and the public is afforded a right of access to the
hearings through the First Amendment, a much stronger right
than that afforded to civil hearings, subject only to overriding
constitutional interests of the accused and third parties.
Information gathering in the main bankruptcy case closely
parallels the process of compelled questioning in criminal prose-
cutions. However, while questioning is held privately in criminal
prosecutions, it is in fact held publicly for most proceedings in
bankruptcy, 235 even if not required by law. In addition, the infor-
mation gathered is mandated by law and rules of procedure,
unlike in civil suits. Further, a statutory and common law right of
public access is afforded any materials filed with the bankruptcy
court, whether those materials rise to the level ofjudicial records
or not,23 6 subject to a much more limited ability to seal records
than that found in civil suits.
Information gathering in adversary proceedings is
equivalent to that in civil suits. The information is gathered in
private, and arguably, the public is afforded the same access
rights under the common law to any judicial records as in any
civil suit.
In the adjudicative phase of each of these three areas of the
law, admission of evidence to the judge or jury predominate. In
civil suits, the hearings and trial are open to the public under the
235. Most first meetings of creditors are generally held as a trailing
docket. They are most often held outside of federal buildings and not in a
courtroom. All debtors and creditors are present, listening to the depositions
of the others, along with anyone else who happens to attend.
236. In approximately 80% of the cases in this district, no hearing is ever
held before ajudge. In most cases, the orders discharging and closing the case
are the only orders entered in the case. In many districts, authority to sign the
orders discharging and closing the case is delegated to the clerk, and a judge is
not involved in the case at all and never sees any of the materials held by the
clerk. Indeed, outside of some creditor motions to release liens, abandon prop-
erty or modify the automatic stay, judges rarely see any of the information gen-
erated in this portion of the case.
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common law, limited by the sound discretion of the trial judge.
In criminal cases, the hearings and trial are open to the public
under the First Amendment, limited only by a overriding consti-
tutional interest of the accused or a third party. In contested
matters in a bankruptcy and adversary proceedings, all hearings
and trials are open to the public pursuant to a rule of procedure
containing no enumerated exceptions.2"7
Finally, the post-trial proceedings and information gathered
in criminal prosecutions is quite similar to the information gath-
ered in case opening and initial examinations of the debtor in a
main bankruptcy case. However, while the information gathered
is similar in scope, the level of general public access afforded to
that information in bankruptcy greatly exceeds that afforded in
the criminal prosecution.
The information gathered in a criminal pre-sentence investi-
gative report mirrors that found in the bankruptcy petition and
accompanying schedules and statements:
The presentence report describes the defendant's charac-
ter and personality, evaluates his or her problems, helps
the reader understand the world in which the defendant
lives, reveals the nature of his or her relationships with
people, and discloses those factors that underlie the
defendant's specific offense and conduct in general.238
Similarly, preliminary bankruptcy documents contain informa-
tion which helps the reader understand the world in which the
defendant lives. It describes what he does for a living, where he
works, how long he has worked there, and reveals the nature of
his relationships with people by showing where he lives, how long
and to some extent whom with, and the contents of his home. It
describes the defendant's character and personality by showing
life circumstances such as what he reads, medical problems,
where he spends his income, detailed cash flows, information on
schooling, any businesses entered into, lawsuits pending, and if
and where he attends church.
Further similarities between bankruptcy and criminal prose-
cutions can be found by comparing the presentence investiga-
tion in criminal proceedings with the examination of the
debtor's affairs in bankruptcy. In criminal prosecutions, the
237. Those few published opinions discussing closure of hearings and tri-
als refer to 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) and FED R. BANKR. P. 9018 for authority to
order any relief that justice requires, including closure.
238. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing
PROBATION DrVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 1 (2d ed. 1984)).
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"[s]entencing proceedings, and particularly the presentence
investigation, often involve a broad-ranging inquiry into a
defendant's private life, not limited by traditional rules of evi-
dence," '239 while examinations of the debtor at the meeting of
creditors, 2004 examinations and investigations by the trustee are
"extremely broad and Collier indicates that [they are] in the
nature of an inquisition and consequently the field of inquiry is
wide and within the limitations prescribed any question is per-
missible which seeks to ascertain facts concerning debtor's con-
duct, property and affairs."
240
Presentence investigation reports are considered confiden-
tial and are filed under seal; third party public access is not
allowed except upon a showing of a compelling, particularized
need for disclosure.241 The basis for this policy is found through
comparisons of the procedures, information and privacy interests
of parties in the presentence investigation with those in a Grand
Jury proceeding.24 2 This same type of comparison to Grand Jury
proceedings and privacy interests has been made in conjunction
with the examinations of the debtor's affairs in bankruptcy. 243 A
strong argument can be made that the same policies of confiden-
tiality and general public access found applicable to presentence
investigation materials should also apply to information concern-
ing debtor's affairs in a main bankruptcy case.
IV. THE GoALS OF COLLECTION AND PUBLIC ACCESS
The information collected and filed with bankruptcy courts
is presented ostensibly to effect the purposes underlying the
bankruptcy law: equitable distribution of a debtor's assets to
239. Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 230.
240. In re Larkham, 24 B.R. 70, 72 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982); see also In re
Lazar, 28 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993); In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc., 156 B.R. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); In reWoods, 69 B.R. 999, 1004 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987); In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. 314, 317 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985); In re Vantage Petroleum Corp., 34 B.R. 650 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
241. See United States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135 (5th Cir. 1995); Corbitt,
879 F.2d at 224; United States v. McKnight, 771 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1983); United
States v. Martinello, 556 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Dingle, 546
F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1976).
242. Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 231-32.
243. See In re Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R 314, 317 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985) (comparing the investigation of debtor's affairs by examiner to a "civil
grand jury"); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414, 432 (1993) (sealing
materials on investigation of debtor); In re Mantolesky, 14 B.R. 973 (Bankr. D.
Mass 1981) (holding an examination under bankruptcy is an inquisition); In re
Larkham, 24 B.R. 70, 71 (finding meeting of creditors to be a broad
inquisition).
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creditors and a fresh start for the honest, but unfortunate debtor.
To accomplish these goals quickly and efficiently, forms and pro-
cedures have developed to assist in locating estate assets, identify-
ing creditors with valid claims to those assets, distributing the
assets equitably to those creditors and identifying debtor and
creditor fraud.
In light of these goals, the threshold question to be
answered before the issue of access becomes whether the infor-
mation collected is legitimately needed to meet the needs and
goals of the bankruptcy process. One measure of the relevance
of information may be the frequency of objections to presenting
the information or appearing at meetings. Another measure may
be the frequency of requests to review types of information and
documents.
The documents and proceedings eliciting the most per-
sonal, probing information of debtors, the case opening docu-
ments and first meeting of creditors, are found in the
administrative portion of a bankruptcy case. The judge is not
involved in the first meeting of creditors, and outside of business
cases, it is extremely uncommon for the judge to use the peti-
tion, schedules and statements to gather information. The bank-
ruptcy clerk's office uses the cover sheet information to identify a
case, the attorney concerned and for the statistical information
supplied, but does not use the other case opening documents.
While the court does not use the schedules and statements, they
are some of the most frequently reviewed documents in a case.
They are reviewed by trustees, creditors named in the schedules
and other parties who are trying to determine if they are a credi-
tor in the case.
While the case opening documents probably contain the
most private information of debtors, the attachments to proofs of
claim, along with the increasing ability to search multiple cases
for references to a specific creditor, provide the most private
information concerning creditors. Again, the proof of claim is
presented in the administrative portion of a bankruptcy case and
is rarely reviewed by ajudge, except for objections based on late
filing. The claims are used by trustees and debtors-in-possession
and reviewed by other creditors. The proof of claim form itself
must be filed and the content is not controversial. The relevance
and need for the attachments to the claim is not a subject of
discussion. Attachments to claims supply information needed to
substantiate a claim, serving a legitimate purpose under bank-
ruptcy law and procedure by alleviating the need to object to
every claim, and therefore, eliminating unnecessary hearings and
judicial involvement in administrative matters.
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The onset of electronic records and clerk's databases allows
probing searches for creditor information across all cases, provid-
ing views of forms and accounting procedures used by creditors,
customer lists and a review of a creditors uncollectible accounts
receivable. Depending on the number of cases a creditor is
involved in and the information it supplies as attachments to
proofs of claim, a very detailed financial and operational picture
of a business can be compiled.
Other documents and pleadings are necessary to claim
rights under various sections of the bankruptcy code or other
law. Most of these other documents are presented in those por-
tions of a bankruptcy case that are not administrative and require
review and determinations under the law by a bankruptcy judge.
The relevance of these documents and any attached materials
are subjects for hearings before the judge.
Excluding the requirement to provide social security num-
bers, the information requested of debtors and creditors in the
administrative portion of a bankruptcy case in opening docu-
ments and assertions of claims is rarely challenged as irrelevant
or overreaching. In addition, objections to appearing at the first
meeting of creditors are equally rare. In contrast, objections to
appearing and supplying information at Rule 2004 examinations
and in discovery in adversary proceedings are common.
As stated previously, outside of discovery disputes, the collec-
tion of social security numbers elicits the most frequent and
growing number of challenges. While there are few published
opinions regarding this issue, clerks' offices receive several peti-
tions each year where debtors or petition preparers at first refuse
to supply their social security number.24 4 Those clerks' offices
that provide access to pleadings over the Internet relate increas-
ing instances where parties object to having their social security
number displayed. As discussed, the social security number is
used by creditors to identify debtors and link their account
records, and by trustees and the Office of the United States
Trustee to identify unlawful filings of bankruptcy petitions. Que-
ries regarding identifying information, especially the social secur-
ity number, are probably the most frequent requests for
information received at clerks' offices. These uses clearly serve a
legitimate need in the bankruptcy process.
It is arguable that social security numbers should not be
required of debtors, and they definitely should not be offered for
244. See In reCrawford, 194 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Adair, 212 B.R.
171 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997); In re Anderson, 159 B.R. 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993); In re Austin, 46 B.R. 358 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985).
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general public access. The purposes cited for requiring these
numbers are legitimate public purposes, preventing fraud and
increasing efficiency by quicker identification of debtors and
protection of creditor rights. However, these numbers are used
too often to commit crimes.
Prior to the ability to catalog and compare more extensive
* information in a database, the social security number supplied
the easiest and only way to meet these purposes. The social
security number remains the easiest means to both identify debt-
ors and other parties and to determine if a filing is lawful. How-
ever, new technology now provides other means to accomplish
the legitimate need for identification. Inclusion of other infor-
mation in a database such as multiple debtor addresses, employ-
ers, specific identification of secured collateral and creditor
identification can collectively help identify debtors and parties
using search and compare abilities lacking under previous tech-
nology. Placing this information in a searchable database will
require labor, and the programs and equipment to provide the
search capabilities will require funding, but these other means
do exist today, lending question to the legitimacy of continued
use of social security numbers in the bankruptcy process.245
While for the most part, the information collected is rele-
vant and legitimately meets a need under the bankruptcy pro-
cess, it should also be asked preficatory to questions of access
rights, whether the information should be collected by the courts
or others. Bases for these decisions are found through the inter-
play between the demographics of the users of the information
and practicality and political considerations.
Arguably, if the court does not use a class of materials, it
should not be filed with the court. In both civil and criminal
contexts, the only materials filed with the court are those for
which there is a high probability of use by a judge. As a conse-
quence of this line of reasoning, the schedules and statements of
affairs should probably not be filed with the courts. In the major-
ity of bankruptcy cases there is no expectation that these docu-
ments will be used by a judge. They will never lie under the
definition of a judicial record as that term is developing in the
courts. Considerations of practicality also bear against filing
these documents with the court. Due to budget restraints and
245. Courts in other countries often provide their own, unique identifiers
to parties, which presumably can be cross checked to look for other cases with
which that person may be involved. See Frederick Schauer, Internet Privacy and
the Public-Private Distinction, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 555, 563 (1998) (discussing Ger-
man practice and the Bundesbaten Schutz Gesetz).
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limits on the number of judges, any bankruptcy court desires to
collect only that information which it needs to adjudicate issues
brought to it and to send out notices it is required to send. The
ill considered collection of information by the courts simply
because it is used by some parties burdens both judges and the
court system, which must index, store and provide access to it.
Scant records of past discussions on this issue indicate that
the opening documents were envisioned to be filed with the
Office of the United States Trustee.246 This place of filing is
most logical because the U.S. Trustee, trustees appointed and
overseen by that office and, to a lesser extent, creditors are the
parties using these documents. While logical, filing with the U.S.
Trustee would require an infrastructure of personnel, office
space and equipment which that office does not possess nor is
likely to receive funding to provide.
With these considerations in mind, the court could continue
to act as the place of filing of all information in a bankruptcy
case. The burden of filing and storage would remain on the
court. However, differing rules applicable to access for the dif-
ferent classes of documents could alleviate the current burden of
providing unlimited access. Legislation could be enacted defin-
ing these documents as agency records of the Office of the
United States Trustee. Physical and/or electronic means could
then be used to distinguish between the types of records for
access purposes. This type of distinction or segregation has
already been considered by the courts in order to meet access
and filing requirements for income tax returns under proposed
legislation. While such distinctions would have been difficult to
provide under old technology, electronic forms of documents
and information make them simple. This means of filing would
allow a compromise between the goals of the court system with
those of the practical considerations relating to any requirement
that case opening information belong to the U.S. Trustee system.
Finally, we can reach the central issue of access to the infor-
mation and proceedings in bankruptcy. Resolution of this issue
follows answering several questions. What are the bases for the
current system of access? What are the problems of the current
system? What benefits does access provide? What harms do the
current levels of access cause? Do the benefits outweigh the
harms? If changes are needed, what alternative access structures
would be more balanced in today's technology?
As discussed previously, under the bankruptcy system today,
levels of access rights are bifurcated. The general public is
246. See supra note 189.
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afforded nearly unlimited access to records and proceedings in
the main bankruptcy case. The general public is afforded much
more limited access to records and proceedings in adversary pro-
ceedings, similar to access provided in civil cases. How or why
the current levels of access were determined or why they vary is
not clear. Current access levels probably arose as the schizo-
phrenic outcome of the interplay between the traditional faction,
which considers the debtor an admitted criminal upon filing and
bankruptcy analogous to a criminal sentencing process, and the
liberal faction, which regards bankruptcy as a rehabilitative pro-
cess for debtors, which attempts to lessen creditor contests over
limited assets.
No matter the circumstances behind its development, the
current access rules have several problems. They are confusing
due to the lack of uniformity of access to records between various
portions of a case. The access rules as regards the main bank-
ruptcy case are inconsistent with the treatment ofjudicial records
overall and even similar records in civil, criminal and other gov-
ernment contexts. Further, due to new technology, current
access rights in bankruptcy impinge unnecessarily on privacy
rights, thus threatening individuals and the courts.
These shortcomings are magnified in the new electronic
environment as evidenced by the increasing complaints relating
to privacy fears. As the balance between privacy and public
access that existed in fact under the old technology, if not under
the law, is tipped, we are left with unthought of consequences.
Certain records and information in the main bankruptcy case,
public under the current system, should probably no longer be
assumed public, and in some instances, alternate information
should be collected.
Arguments advocating keeping the current levels of public
access to bankruptcy information and proceedings in the main
bankruptcy case cite to five general categories of benefits pro-
vided by this access. First, general public access forces integrity
in the bankruptcy system by placing all that happens under harsh
public scrutiny. Second, flowing from forced integrity, general
public access helps to maintain confidence of the public in the
bankruptcy system. Third, general public access allows "accurate,
reliable data about the bankruptcy system" to be collected, aiding
evaluation and speeding change to bankruptcy laws and
processes.247 Fourth, access to all bankruptcy information by the
247. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRuprcv: THE
NEXT TWENTY YEARS (1997); Joseph A. Guzinski, Government's Emerging Role as a
Source of Empirical Information in Bankruptcy Cases, 17 AM. BANR. INST. J. 8
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general public helps lenders to make better informed decisions
on extending new credit, thus helping to alleviate harm to credi-
tors and contributing to efficiencies in the credit markets. 248
Finally, access to all information in a specific case by that
debtor's creditors is necessary because those creditors are the
new interest holders in the estate and are entitled to know every-
thing, even otherwise private, about the debtor and estate in
order for the bankruptcy process to work.249
Clearly, all of these goals are legitimate needs and interests.
The first three points reflect the general interest of the people in
monitoring and evaluating a government process. As it regards
bankruptcy, this interest is reflected in the ability to review the
effects of the law as a whole and the actions of individual judges
applying that law. The fourth point reflects the interests of the
commercial segment of the public, and to a much lesser extent
the general public, to use the credit information gathered in the
bankruptcy process for uses other than adjudicating a case. The
fifth point raises an issue that can be characterized as structural
to the bankruptcy system in that information is vital to creditors
who play a large role as parties in specific cases and thus are a
contributory part of the bankruptcy system.
Arguments advocating altering the current levels of public
access to bankruptcy information and proceedings cite to six
general categories of harms from this access. First, unlimited
access impinges unnecessarily on privacy rights, by providing
more access than is necessary to achieve the public benefits of
evaluating and monitoring a government process. Second,
unlimited access and dissemination rights under new technology
chills those seeking redress under the bankruptcy laws through
the courts of the use of the rights to use the courts. Third,
unlimited access limits the fresh start, an integral element of the
bankruptcy law, by placing a stigma upon debtors and limiting
access to new extensions of credit. Fourth, current access levels
result in inconsistent and discriminatory treatment of parties and
information across federal causes of action. Fifth, unlimited
access and dissemination rights contribute unnecessarily to
threats of physical harm to parties. Finally, unlimited access and
dissemination rights contribute unnecessarily, and probably
cause, economic harms to parties, identity theft, credit fraud and
(1998); Should You be Able to Access Bankruptcy Files from the Internet?, 32 Bank. Ct.
Decisions 1 (1998).
248. See In re Laws, 223 B.R. 714 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998).
249. See In re 50-Off Stores, Inc., 213 B.R. 646, 654 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1997).
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lender redlining, which would not occur with more limited forms
of access.
The first two points relate to the legitimate purpose of bal-
ancing and protecting constitutional rights of all types of parties
through limits on access. The third point reflects the need to
consider all the goals of the bankruptcy system in determining
access levels. The fourth point reflects the need for consistency
in protecting information required by the courts. The final two
points relate to recent concerns raised due to new technology
and reflect the need to consider the ramifications of access no
matter the type of technology available.
Determining whether the benefits outweigh the harms
requires a discussion of the points raised by each side, including
the merit and magnitude or contribution of the benefit or harm.
Since those arguing change do not dispute that some level of
access is necessary to provide for the legitimate public purposes
recited, it would be most productive to look at the merit and
magnitude of the harms claimed from extensive access.
The first harm stated, unnecessary intrusion on the right to
privacy, is perhaps the greatest harm. The right of privacy is a
fundamental, constitutionally protected right.25 ° While so pro-
tected, debtors seeking relief under the bankruptcy code acqui-
esce to some invasion of their privacy rights. Advocates of
limited disclosure argue that while debtors agree to supply pri-
vate information for the limited purpose of administration of
their bankruptcy case, it does not follow that they also are agree-
ing to full disclosure to all the world. They argue further, that
while full access of parties to the case to the information col-
lected is necessary to administer the case, it does not follow that
unlimited access to the general public is required or necessary
for that administration. They state that, "the fact that an event is
not wholly 'private' does not mean that an individual has no
interests in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the
information."2 5
1
The basis given for requiring such extensive access is the
probability of participation from unlisted third parties in a case,
whether as a creditor newly come forward or as informant supply-
ing information on assets transferred by fraudulent debtors.
While this purpose is laudable and legitimate, advocates of lim-
ited access argue that it is not being fulfilled by unlimited access.
Very rarely does public participation from publication of bank-
250. See supra Pt. 1I.
251. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770-71 (1989) (citation omitted).
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ruptcy information come as a result of the public broadcast of
information from court records by the media and, certainly, the
general public does not come to the courthouse to randomly
peruse bankruptcy case files. Most queries received at the court
from third parties come from entities and individuals who heard
from a debtor or a creditor that had received a notice directly
from the court that a specific debtor had filed, or from lenders
who are not trying to participate in a case but are using the court
as a free credit reporting service. In other words, members of
the general public do not participate in bankruptcy cases
because they hear of them from the news media or because they
avail themselves of unlimited access to the courts.
Advocates argue further that provision of records on the
Internet will not change this result. People will not go to a court
website everyday to review newly filed cases to determine if they
should participate in a case. They will not read newspapers or
newspaper websites daily to review a list of those who filed bank-
ruptcy to determine if they should participate in a case. They will
acquire bankruptcy information under the same circumstances
as they do with paper records, from debtors and through the
grapevine from those creditors who received notice directly from
the court about a case.
Advocates of limited disclosure are, therefore, correct. Pri-
vacy rights are being unnecessarily invaded because the purpose
sought to be served is not served by the access currently allowed.
In addition, advocates of limited disclosure argue that treat-
ment of private information in bankruptcy is inconsistent with
protections afforded that same information in other contexts.
Most of the information supplied by debtors is financial, other
information in the petition regarding one's family, medical serv-
ices received and religious affiliations fall under specific areas
where the Supreme Court has spoken to constitutional protec-
tions of privacy. Add to the list, social security numbers, and
almost every part of the opening documents in an individual
bankruptcy case are either specifically protected private informa-
tion or information that is afforded very restricted access in other
venues.
25 2
Outside of social security numbers, there is little argument
that this private information is needed to properly administer a
bankruptcy case and protect creditor rights. However, the point
is well made that the means necessary to meet these needs differ
252. See Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d. 1026, 1031 (7th Cir.
1996); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co, Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 476-78 (6th Cir.
1983); Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 680-82 (Wash. 1982).
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greatly from the amount of access necessary to monitor the bank-
ruptcy, system or provide for participation of third parties in a
specific case.
While the point raised regarding this harm has great merit,
the magnitude of the harm from current unlimited disclosure is
a subject of debate. The magnitude of this harm varies with the
measurer. While one is horrified at disclosure of his or her own
financial affairs, one usually doesn't think twice about disclosure
of those same affairs of others.25 3
It will always be difficult to measure the current harm from
loss of a fundamental right. However, the fact remains that soci-
ety as we know it depends upon these fundamental rights. It
should always be asked if the need espoused cannot be filled in
any other way before so easily giving up such fundamental rights
as privacy. Chipping away at fundamental rights is indeed an
insidious danger.
Those in favor of unlimited access also argue that the magni-
tude of the invasion of privacy is in actuality low and debtors
receive a trade off, bankruptcy relief for loss of privacy. That
leads into questions of the propriety of relinquishing one consti-
tutional right to exercise another.
Proponents' arguments regarding chilling of access to the
courts for redress under the bankruptcy laws may be considered
amusing and facetious in light of the number of bankruptcy cases
filed in the last ten years. This great level of filing occurred in
spite of unlimited access to paper records. Under these circum-
stances, it is difficult to sustain an argument that disclosure of
private facts in bankruptcy chills debtors from accessing bank-
ruptcy courts.
Advocates of limiting access argue that while it is true that
disclosure does not chill access to the courts with paper records,
with electronic public dissemination of the private information
in bankruptcy tied to social security numbers and other person-
ally identifiable information, the probability increases enor-
mously that filing may indeed be chilled. They also argue that
one should not have to give up one constitutional right, the right
to privacy, to exercise another constitutional right, the right to
seek redress through the courts because:
[tlhere is no single divine constitutional right to whose
reign all others are subject. When one constitutional right
cannot be protected to the ultimate degree without violat-
253. See introduction of this paper; Glenn R. Simpson, Plan to Release
Judge's Financial Data by Online Concern is Blocked by Court, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
1999, at Al0.
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ing another, the trial judge must find the course that will
recognize and protect each in just measure, forfeiting
neither and permitting neither to dominate the other.
2 54
While the right to seek redress through the courts is often
espoused, the extent of any such right is fuzzy. 255 It is clear that
there is no right of access to the bankruptcy court under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 56 However,
some type of right to access bankruptcy court exists under other
constitutional provisions as has been found in other contexts.25 7
"It is also true that, [i]f the debtor did not file bankruptcy, that
information would almost never be available on demand to the
public at large (and certainly not under penalty of perjury).-258
Moreover:
Rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, indi-
viduals may well forego the pursuit of their just claims.
The judicial system will thus have made the utilization of its
remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or
unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valu-
able as that of speech itself.
259
Advocates of limiting access argue that the goals stated to
justify unlimited access, participation of unknown members of
the public in a specific case and protection of creditor rights, can
be met by more limited access, which protects redress through
the court. They argue that the level of access currently provided
is not present just for the goals stated, but is there for other pur-
poses. In particular, they state that the underlying purposes for
unlimited access include discouraging debtors from filing and
using public employees and funds to collect information for
commercial purposes outside of the needs of bankruptcy. They
argue that these unstated purposes are filled at too high a cost to
privacy and the bankruptcy system.
Indeed, publication of extremely private, personally identifi-
able information is a strong impetus against filing. If discourag-
254. United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 1983).
255. See Carol R. Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause
of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999); J. Stein-
man, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants be permitted to Keep
Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1985).
256. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
257. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (Petition Clause of the
1st Amendment); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972) (Petition Clause of 1st Amendment); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239
(1898) (Article IV, Privileges & Immunities Clause).
258. In re 50-Off Stores, Inc., 213 B.R. 646, 654 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
259. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 689 (Wash. 1982).
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ing filing through the invasion of privacy caused by unlimited
access is a basis for providing such access, losing rights to privacy
seems a high price to pay when a lessor cost, redrafting the bank-
ruptcy statute to embody more difficult filing requirements or
lessened benefits to filing, would provide a better and more bal-
anced solution to the perceived problem.
Arguments of proponents for limiting access regarding the
fresh start seem specious. The public should be able to review
credit information and be advised that debtors have defaulted,
pay slowly or have filed bankruptcy. Even assuming that the
release of information by the court harms the fresh start, the
magnitude of that harm must be small. Discharged debtors have
more opportunity to receive credit than ever before. Many credi-
tors even seek out and solicit extensions of credit to newly dis-
charged debtors because they cannot receive another discharge
for the next seven years. While this argument appears to have
much lesser merit, it is also true that the public should not use
the courthouse as a credit reporting agency, and the question
becomes where the public should receive credit information.
Next, one can argue that access by third parties to materials
in bankruptcy should be consistent with the level of access pro-
vided to similar materials in civil or criminal cases. One can
argue that the difference in access is discriminatory against debt-
ors in bankruptcy in two ways. First, discovery materials contain-
ing similar private information submitted as required through
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are given more protection
from disclosure than the same information submitted in a bank-
ruptcy case. Second, specifically as regarding the opening docu-
ments in a main bankruptcy case, one can argue that these
documents are analogous to presentence investigative reports in
both content and usage, and therefore, case opening documents
are given less protection from disclosure than the same type of
document in a criminal case. Finally, it can be argued that the
same opportunities to abuse the forced discovery in civil cases
exist in bankruptcy and the rationale behind the decision in Seat-
tle Times should be applied to protect the debtor and other par-
ties drawn into a bankruptcy case.
In rebuttal, advocates of disclosure argue that the forced dis-
covery attendant in both opening documents and the required
deposition, the first meeting of creditors, meet the goal of
extremely speedy administration of bankruptcy cases; time is
money. In conjunction with this goal, unlimited public access
will inform the public faster and lead quickly to both addition of
any new, unlisted creditors and to information of unknown pref-
erential or fraudulent transfers. In consideration of these goals
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then, access to information must be greater than that allowed in
a civil case.
Unquestionably, most of the information required in bank-
ruptcy case opening documents is relevant, and requiring the
information to be provided at the time of filing clearly meets the
goals of speedy administration. No one appears to argue that
this goal has no merit or that another system of data collection or
discovery would better serve administration of cases. The second
point concerning unlimited disclosure and participation of third
parties in a case is much weaker. If unlimited disclosure was truly
successful in meeting this goal, an argument could be main-
tained to keep such disclosure; however, as discussed previously,
there is no evidence that unlimited disclosure serves this goal.
Third parties do not receive information on cases due to unlim-
ited disclosure. They receive information from the debtor and
through the grapevine, from creditors who received their infor-
mation due to the noticing requirements of the court in the Fed-
eral Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
No matter one's position on this point, the difference in
treatment looks discriminatory. Indeed, to the extent bank-
ruptcy case opening documents can validly be analogized to
presentence investigative reports, it appears that those who com-
mit the "crime" of bankruptcy receive fewer privacy protections
than those who commit other crimes.
Finally, the points raised regarding physical and economic
harms grow in merit with every passing day as reported accounts
of identity theft and credit fraud increase exponentially. While
claims of these harms have merit, it is argued that the magnitude
of the harms is small, as they are speculative and hypothetical
and the probability of these harms befalling any single debtor are
low. While true even ten years ago, this argument loses strength
every day as the reported cases of these harms increase. Cur-
rently, the bankruptcy electronic database is ripe for identity
theft crimes and also provides a ripe ground for stalking individ-
uals. While it is true that the probability remains fairly low that
any one individual will suffer these harms from access to the elec-
tronic bankruptcy database, the probability that this database will
be used to support such crimes is very high, especially when com-
pared to the probability of use of the paper data files for such
purposes.
This discussion establishes that privacy, a fundamental, con-
stitutional right, and the right to seek redress under the laws
through the courts, another constitutional right, are being
harmed unnecessarily through application of common law and
statutory rights of access to bankruptcy records. In addition, it
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appears that the goals sought to be reached by providing the stat-
utory level of access in bankruptcy, though laudable, are not suc-
cessfully being met through that access. Therefore, not only is
the balance of rights inverted due to current access levels, but
the threat and probability of physical and economic harms befall-
ing individuals is greatly increased unnecessarily because of it.
So, what level of access or privacy should be provided under
the law? "How can the courts fashion and administer meaningful
rules for protecting privacy without unconstitutionally setting
themselves up as censors or editors? '2 60 How can the courts
serve the public interests and not be "catering to prurient inter-
ests without proper public purpose or corresponding assurance
of public benefit"26' even though it is true that "[o]nce a matter
is brought before a court for resolution, it is no longer the par-
ties' case but also the public's case"?2 62
First, in evaluating any changes to access levels, one must
consider both the state of access law and the goals of the bank-
ruptcy system. At this time, no right to unlimited access to gov-
ernment records has been found to exist under the Constitution
or common law.263 Unlimited access to records held by the
courts is also not provided in either civil or criminal contexts.
However, access by parties involved in a specific bankruptcy case
to wide ranging information on debtors is necessary for the bank-
ruptcy system to work.
Based upon these considerations, access levels to personal
identifiers should be changed to reflect the level of participation
of the requesting party to a specific case. Parties involved in a
case should receive expansive access. However, the general pub-
lic should only be provided access to those records where it
serves the interest of the public in monitoring the process, a goal
successfully met by various circumscribed levels of access.
Most of the interests stated by advocates of expansive access
should and can be served through some limited form of access.
The interests in quickly bringing unknown parties into a case and
in discouraging filing should be served by means other than
access to court records.
260. Shulman, v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 474 (Cal. 1998).
261. In re Application of KSTP Television, 504 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D.
Minn. 1980).
262. Brown v. Advanced Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.
1992).
263. See L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 120 S.Ct. 483
(1999); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965); Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1994); Cal-
der v. I.R.S., 890 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Access to the documents and information in specific cases,
stripped of personally identifiable information, names,
addresses, telephone numbers and social security numbers,
should still provide all the information necessary to monitor the
system as a whole, its application to specific individuals and indi-
vidual entities. Even stripped of personal identification, enough
information will be disclosed to evaluate debtors, the nature of
debts, the administration of a case, and whether particular debt-
ors, creditors, trustees or attorneys are receiving discriminatory
treatment. In addition, this level of information retains enough
character to identify the trustee, attorneys and judge involved to
evaluate their respective performance. Further, access to the
personally identifiable information by the court and Office of the
United States Trustee should provide adequate ability to search
for fraud and serial filing, especially considering that these are
the entities that currently perform this function anyway.
Those materials that have infinitesimal probability of becom-
ing judicial records and that contain information which can be
provided to the judge by other means when necessary, in particu-
lar the petition, schedules, statements of affairs and creditor lists,
could be held and access provided as applicable to the records of
executive agencies. The access requirements and limitations of
the Freeedom of Information Act would presumably apply and
could be administered by the court.
While the first three interests of expansive access advocates
can be served through electronic records by similar means as
those used in other government record contexts, such as remov-
ing personally identifying information from case data before
releasing it to the general public as discussed above, the fourth
and fifth points require more. Under the fifth point, the role of
all parties in a case requires the ability to identify the debtor and
other parties, and to receive complete information on debtor's
affairs no matter how personal. Unarguably, parties involved in a
specific case need some type of personal identification informa-
tion of other parties and probably should receive this informa-
tion from the courts to protect due process rights. In addition,
third parties not listed in a case should be provided adequate
information to determine if they are involved.
Under the fourth point, the access needs of the commercial
interests in society also require personally identifiable informa-
tion on specific cases and ultimate case status. It is harder to
justify any access to personal identification information from
court records for commercial third parties, as the benefits they
seek from access are not related to monitoring the government
function of the courts or contributing to the bankruptcy process.
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However, it is also important to place value on the societal inter-
est of the smooth flow of credit. The question under the fourth
point becomes whether the courts should be the source of this
information, or whether commercial third parties should rely on
the other available sources which have this information and from
which they receive all the other information they hold. The bank-
ruptcy courts should not be a master credit bureau where lenders
and commercial credit bureaus come for information. Credit
bureaus receive most other information directly from lenders
and should receive information on a bankruptcy filing from the
same sources. Those lenders seeking information prior to
extending credit should look to the credit bureaus for that infor-
mation, not the bankruptcy court.
V. SOLUTIONS
The long term solution to these concerns requires action by
Congress and many changes by the courts and debtors' counsel.
The major requirement for long term change requires the judici-
ary, or another group, to propose changes to 11 U.S.C. §107.
The most efficient change would be to eliminate it. Doing so
would place access to bankruptcy records on the same founda-
tions as access in other proceedings in the federal courts. Should
such a change be untenable, legislation will be needed amending
11 U.S.C. §107 in two ways. First, language should be added stat-
ing that, though filed with the courts, the petition commencing a
case and associated documents filed at case opening are not judi-
cial records. Second, existing language in 11 U.S.C. §107 should
be amended to provide that the same rules of access apply to
judicial records in bankruptcy as in any civil case. Any amend-
ment to define the term judicial records is probably premature
and confining.
After making these statutory changes, processes will have to
be derived that effect the intent of the changes. Any such new
procedures adopted have to provide for the short time frames of
the bankruptcy process. In addition, they must provide adequate
information to the public and entities seeking to determine if
they are parties to a case.
The solutions that follow primarily involve information in
bankruptcy cases. Access to hearings and trials where a judge
presides should remain open to all as is current practice. Access
to those proceedings that are not held before a judge and that
constitute discovery, should continue to be closed except to
applicable parties as with any civil case.
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To effect long term changes to the access ability of bank-
ruptcy documents and information, various rules and forms will
need to be changed and proposed. Rule 1005 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure should be amended. Other rules
may have to be amended or proposed. Changes to official forms
will need to be made reflecting any changes to the level of access
and the techniques used to accommodate the varying access
levels. Forms requiring such changes would include Official
Form 1, the voluntary petition, Notice of Commencement of
Case and First Meeting of Creditors, Application to Pay Filing
Fee in Installments and the Notice of Discharge. Other forms
may need to be designed to segregate personally identifiable
information.
The specific changes to all of these rules and forms will
reflect choices in regards to several forms of personably identifi-
able information. Amendments regarding identifying numbers
can be made following a choice whether the social security
number or tax identification number of debtors and petition
preparers should continue to be required. If it is decided to
keep this information in a case, then choices must be made on
whether access should be restricted to the court and the Office of
the United States Trustee or to the court, Office of the United
States Trustee and parties in a case. While the requirement of
other personably identifiable information is not debated, a simi-
lar choice on access must be made regarding names, addresses
and phone numbers of, respectively, debtors, petition preparers,
attorneys and creditors before any amendments to rules and pro-
cedures can be made.
Whether identifying numbers continue to be required or
not, supporting a choice to restrict access of the general public
solely to information that is not personally identified or other-
wise sensitive requires that access be limited to information nec-
essary to evaluate the system and enough specific information to
allow a person to make an initial determination that they may be
involved in a case. Such information would include: case
number, chapter, filing state and county, name, address and
phone number of debtor's attorney, name, address and phone
number of the case trustee, name of the judge, gross information
on the dollar value of assets and debts, the number of creditors,
the legal description of any real property and the VIN of any
automobiles. Case status information and dates would also need
to be provided, including dates of: case opening, discharge, con-
version, dismissal and closing.
Debtor and creditor names, addresses, phone numbers,
account numbers, signatures and any identifying numbers,
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should be segregated either by placement on a specific page of a
form, a separate form, or placement in a separate field in an elec-
tronic form and database. The ability to search using combina-
tions of this information would need to be available for the court
to uniquely identify individual debtors on demand. All pleadings
subsequent to the case opening documents would be identified
by case number only. Any request for docket information would
provide the case number, state, county, trustee and attorney
names, addresses and phone numbers and a listing of case docu-
ments. Should it be found difficult to keep debtor names off of
subsequent pleadings, then the schedules and statements would
probably have restricted access to protect the privacy of the sensi-
tive information they contain.
This system would protect privacy rights of debtors and cred-
itors while allowing the general public access to relevant informa-
tion to evaluate the bankruptcy process and enough information
to determine if they should individually seek increased access to
a case.
Means to seek such increased access should also be devel-
oped. Filing a proof of claim will probably be enough to gain
access to a case. Attachments to the claim as well as execution of
the claim under a perjury and good faith clause should foreclose
any misuse of this process merely to gain access to cases. A
motion seeking to be added as a party in a case could also be
used for this purpose or for requests by news media and
academia for access to special cases such as those of movie stars
or political figures.
Provision of unrestricted access to case parties requires
other changes. The presence of debtor information in separate
fields easily provides the means to identify parties in a case
through a search by a computer. Identification of parties in a
case with the current combination of paper and automation is
not as simple. In electronic files, a party identified by the debtor,
or later admitted to a case, would need to be given a password by
the court in a notice of commencement of case or another
appropriate notice. That password could be unique to a case or
be unique to an entity, and be linked to all cases that entity was
involved in. If the password is unique to an entity, it could be a
national level password or district level password. Access to a
case could require entry of case number, debtor name, party
name and the password provided by the court. These passwords
could be time limited and could reflect access levels of court per-
sonnel, the Office of the United States Trustee, the case trustee
or other types of parties.
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Electronic information possessed by the courts prior to any
enactment of these changes will require limited access or need to
be redacted to reflect the access level of the entity seeking access.
Providing several levels of access to information which is in elec-
tronic form, but in which identifying information is embedded
and not in separate fields is more difficult. Access to the general
public may have to be denied unless the information can be
redacted.
As a final long term concern, the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act requires records of bankruptcy filings be removed from
credit reporting files ten years after a case is closed. It can be
argued that general public access to bankruptcy records should
also be ended after ten years with reopening for access upon
motion for good reason or cause.
As a practical, short term solution, courts can continue to
treat paper records as the official court record and provide the
same level of access to these records as required by the current
system of access, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §107. Any electronic court
records, which have not been "filed" with the court, then fall
outside of the bankruptcy statute and rules, and the court is free
to fashion its own rules of access. 264
These rules can distinguish between the types of electronic
documents and roles of requestors in a specific case. If a reques-
tor is a party to a case, the court may provide electronic access to
all information including personally identifiable information. If
a requestor is a third party seeking access to a case opening docu-
ments the court may require that a FOIA request be made for
electronic access and if granted provide the information subject
to removal of any excepted information. If the requestor is a
third party requesting other records held by the court, the elec-
tronic information can be provided stripped of all personal
identification.
Should any party seek more electronic information than that
provided, the court can provide for a hearing, and the requestor
should make a showing of a particularized need to see the elec-
tronic information, such as is required to access a Presentence
Investigative Report, or the hearing can be held to take evidence
that a party is a creditor and should be added to a case and pro-
vided electronic access.
264. This treatment is found in practice in many courts. The state courts
of Colorado have gone farther than most and instituted rules in that regard. See
Office of the State Court Adm'r v. Background Info. Serv., Inc., 994 P.2d 420
(Colo. 1999); Background Info. Serv., Inc. v. Office of the State Court Adm'r,
980 P.2d 991 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
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Shortcomings to this short term solution arise when a court
accepts electronic filings, especially of case opening documents.
In these circumstances, the electronic record is the official rec-
ord and 11 U.S.C. §107 applies to determine access. To alleviate
the impact of this problem, parties should not present case open-
ing documents, and the courts should also not accept case open-
ing documents, for electronic filing. At a minimum, parties
should not electronically file any pleading requiring social secur-
ity and tax identification numbers and account numbers, includ-
ing case opening documents, applications to pay in installments
and monthly operating reports.
CONCLUSION
In summary, changes in technology are harming individuals
who are drawn into the bankruptcy system through violation of
their constitutional rights to privacy in sensitive, personally iden-
tifying information. The public access levels provided to infor-
mation in bankruptcy exceed and are inconsistent with public
access levels to similar information in other contexts. These vio-
lations of privacy rights and the inconsistencies can be ended by
changing the bankruptcy code, rules and forms to better distin-
guish that level of access required for the purposes of the general
public seeking evaluation of the system, from that of creditors
seeking to participate in a case. The methods presented seek to
leave intact the "practical obscurity" of the current level of access
with paper records, under which the open records requirement
of 11 U.S.C. 107 was enacted, in our growing electronic
environment.
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